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TORTIOUS INVASION OF PRIVACY: MINNESOTA AS A
MODEL
Many authorities have analyzed the tort of invasion of privacy. Proba-
bly the most authoritative approach to this tort presently is that enun-
ciated by the late William Prosser. This Note evaluates Prosser's ap-
proach against the sociopsychological concept of privacy and concludes
that Prosser's approach is overinclusive, protecting interests other than
privacy. However, the aspects of Prosser's approach which are consis-
tent with the sociopsychological concept of privacy are used, together
with analogous Minnesota common law, to formulate a modified defini-
tion of tortious invasion of privacy. In addition, the constitutional and
common law limitations on the modified tort are examined.
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I. INTRODUCTION
The human desire for privacy may well be instinctive.' Almost all
animals seek periods of seclusion, manifesting territorial behavior in
which they seek private claim to a geographically proximate area of
land, water, or air.2 Privacy is also a function of human institutions. The
importance of privacy varies among cultures;' the importance of privacy
in highly advanced civilizations may depend upon social and political
1. See generally R. ARsuEY, THE TERRITORIAL IMPERATIVE (1966); E. HALL, THE HIDDEN
DIMENSION 7-40 (1966). It also has been observed that there is a universal tendency for
humans and other primates to seek invasion of others' privacy, probably as a derivative
of instinctive curiosity. A. WESTIN, PRIVACY AND FREEDOM 19-21 (1967). See also THE
SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 332-33 (K. Wolff ed. 1950) (humans have a fascination with
secrecy).
2. See, e.g., Carpenter, Territoriality: A Review of Concepts and Problems, in BEHAVIOR
AND EvOLTrION 230-42 (A. Roe & G. Simpson eds. 1958); Hediger, The Evolution of Terri-
torial Behavior, in SOCIAL LIFE OF EARLY MAN 34-57 (S. Washburn ed. 1961). See also H.
HOWARD, TERRITORY IN BiRD LIFE (1920); V. WYNEE-EDWARDS, ANIMAL DIsPERsION IN RELA-
TION TO SOCIAL BEHAVIOUR (1962).
3. Many studies have revealed the differing emphasis of privacy among primative socie-
ties. Compare, e.g., D. LEE, FREEDOM AND CULTURE 75 (1959) (virtue of unending compan-
ionship among the Ontong-Javanese) and M. MEAD, COMING OF AGE IN SAMOA 20-21, 133-
37 (1928) (bathing, sexual relations, birth, and death are completely public in Samoan
society) with, e.g., Murphy, Social Distance and the Veil, 66 AM. ANTHROPoLoGIsT 1257
(1964) (veils worn by men of North African tribe symbolizing the "distance setting"
process).
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values. Unlike totalitarian societies,' democratic societies emphasize
the importance of pursuing individual interests beyond those of citizen-
ship and politics. 5 Privacy is a shield for the protection of these inter-
ests.' As Justice Douglas once said: "The right to be let alone is indeed
the beginning of all freedom." 7
However, even democratic ideals of individuality are no justification
for an absolute right of privacy. Democratic societies cannot function
without inquiry into legitimate matters of public interest such as unlaw-
ful deviation from societal norms.' Under many circumstances the pub-
lic has a legitimate "right to know." 9 Privacy, therefore, must yield
when it significantly endangers the democratic paradigm.
The task of the law, then, is to strike the proper balance between the
individual's right of privacy and the public's right to know. 0 This task
has assumed special importance in view of the highly advanced tools
which have been developed to acquire and disclose information." Cam-
eras capable of telescoping images located one thousand yards away or
penetrating through walls leave little untouched by the intruding eye."
Laser beams, one-quarter inch thick, capable of detecting sound waves
4. Totalitarian and authoritarian advocates frequently attack the concept of privacy.
E.g., Dicks, Observations on Contemporary Russian Behaviour, 5 HUMAN REL. 111, 140,
163-64 (1952); Mead & Calas, Child-training Ideals in a Postrevolutionary Context: Soviet
Russia, in CHILDHOOD IN CONTEMPORARY CULTURES 190 (M. Mead & M. Wolfenstein eds.
1955) (child-training writings in Soviet Russia). See generally Hollander, Privacy: A Bas-
tion Stormed, 12 PROB. COMMUNISM 1 (Nov.-Dec. 1963).
5. See, e.g., Shils, Social Inquiry and the Autonomy of the Individual, in THE HUMAN
JMEANING OF THE SOCIAL SCIENCES 114-57 (D. Lerner ed. 1959) (problems o obtaining data
for the social sciences in democratic cultures which emphasize the'importance of individu-
ality and privacy).
6. Westin, Science, Privacy, and Freedom: Issues and Proposals for the 1970's, 66
COLUM. L. REv. 1003, 1019 (1966).
7. Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 467 (1952) (Douglas, J., dissenting).
8. See, e.g., State v. Cross, 296 Minn. 16, 21, 206 N.W.2d 371, 375 (1973) ("with due
regard for the right of privacy," a police officer may search an arrested person to the extent
necessary to protect the safety of the officer and prevent the destruction of evidence);
Westin, supra note 6, at 1020.
9. See Pound, The Fourteenth Amendment and the Right of Privacy, 13 W. RES. L. Rzv.
34, 35-36 (1961). See also H. CROSS, THE PEOPLE'S RIGHT TO KNOW (1953) (discussing the
routes of access to public records and proceedings); J. HOBSON, THE DAMNED INFORMATION
(1971) (same).
10. See, e.g., Pound, supra note 9, at 35-36; Westin, supra note 6, at 1050; Note, Right
to Privacy: Social Interest and Legal Right, 51 MINN. L. REv. 531, 533 (1967).
11. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967) (fourth amendment and the exclu-
sionary rule of evidence protects against illegal wiretapping); Oppenheim, I Wonder Who's
Watching Me Now, 4 CA1LE REPORT 1 (Jan. 1975) (threat to privacy from cable television),
reprinted in THE RIGHT TO PRIVACY 156-61 (G. McClellan ed. 1976).
12. E.g., A. WESTIN, supra note 1, at 70-73; Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, The Legal Protec-
tion of Privacy: A Comparative Survey of Ten Countries, 24 INT'L Soc. ScI. J. 417, 424
(1972).
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in a room blocks away leave little untouched by the intruding ear.13
Computers storing a plethora of private data pose an ominous threat to
privacy."1
Minnesota law, in several contexts, already has struck the balance
between the individual's right of privacy and the public's right to know.
For example, the Minnesota Data Privacy Act limits the use of confiden-
tial and private information collected by state agencies. 5 The Privacy
of Communications Act places severe restrictions on interception of wire
or oral communications by electronic, mechanical, or other devices.,,
13. E.g., A. WESTIN, supra note 1, at 75; Int'l Comm'n of Jurists, supra note 12, at 425.
14. E.g., A. MILLER, THE ASSAULT ON PRIVACY 24-53 (1971). See generally U.S. DEP'T OF
HEALTH, EDUC. & WELFARE, RECORDS, COMPUTERS, AND THE RIGHTS OF CITIZENS (1973). For
a discussion of various secret files kept on citizens, see A. NEIER, DOSSIER (1975).
15. See MINN. STAT. §§ 15.162-.169 (1976), as amended by Act of June 2, 1977, ch. 375,
1977 Minn. Laws 825, as amended by Act of June 9, 1977, ch. 455, § 94, 1977 Minn. Laws
1446. The Minnesota Data Privacy Act provides that public, private, or confidential data
shall not be used, collected, or disseminated by state agencies, except as necessary for the
lawful purpose of administering and managing programs specifically authorized by the
government. See MINN. STAT. § 15.1641 (1976).
"Public data" is defined as that information which is on public record. See id. §
15.162(5b). "Private data" is defined as information which is not on public record but
which by law is accessible to the individual subject of that information. See id. §
15.162(5a). Confidential data is defined as information which is (1) "not public . . . and
is inaccessible to the individual subject of that data" or (2) "collected by a civil or criminal
investigative agency as a part of an active investigation undertaken for the purpose of the
commencement of a legal action .... " Id. § 15.162(2a), as amended by Act of June 2,
1977, ch. 375, § 1, 1977 Minn. Laws 825, as amended by Act of June 9, 1977, ch. 455, §
94, 1977 Minn. Laws 1446.
Classification of the data is largely within the discretion of the local state agency,
although each political subdivision must designate a "responsible authority" to oversee
the collection and use of data. See MINN. STAT. § 15.162(6) (1976), as amended by Act of
June 2, 1977, ch. 375, § 5, 1977 Minn. Laws 826. Considerable confusion over the availabil-
ity of some data has resulted, and in 1976 the Commissioner of Administration for the
State of Minnesota concluded: "There is little uniformity in the classification of data on
individuals and the policies and practices followed to administer that data." COMMIS-
SIONER OF ADMINISTRATION, STATE OF MINNESOTA, REPORT TO THE LEGISLATURE OF THE STATE
OF MINNESOTA 24 (1976). The Commissioner found, for example:
One county classified portions of welfare board minutes as confidential. Another
county classified them as private. One sheriff reported juvenile records as the
only records classified as private or confidential. Other sheriffs indicated that
adult criminal histories, investigation records, traffic violations, etc. are either
private or confidential.
Id. at 8.
If data is classified as either private or confidential, special limitations are placed on
its use. Private and confidential data cannot be used, collected, or disseminated pursuant
to a lawful purpose unless: (1) the responsible authority files a statement with the Com-
missioner of the Department of Administration describing the purpose, and the Commis-
sioner approves the purpose; or (2) the purpose is authorized by the state or federal
legislature; or (3) the individual subject of the data has given informed consent to the use.
MINN. STAT. § 15.1641(c) (1976).
16. MINN. STAT. §§ 626A.01-.23 (1976), as amended by Act of May 11, 1977, ch. 82, §
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Rules of evidence protect privacy by privileging several types of confi-
dential communications. 7 Also, pretrial discovery cannot involve an
unwarranted invasion of privacy."'
Still, Minnesota law affords no comprehensive protection for privacy,
either by statute or judicial decision. Perhaps existing torts such as
intentional infliction of mental distress, trespass, and nuisance can pro-
vide adequate protection; 9 most probably they cannot." The purpose of
this Note is to analyze the tort of invasion of privacy and to set forth a
new definition of the tort using Minnesota law as a model. It will not
6, 1977 Minn. Laws 134. The Act not only prohibits interception of communications by
electronic, mechanical, or other devices, MINN. STAT. § 626A.02(1)(a)-(b) (1976), but also
prohibits the use of intercepted communications, id. § 626A.02(c)-(d), the manufacture
or distribution of interception devices, id. § 626A.03, and the deception of telephone or
telegraph companies to obtain protected information or access to certain company prem-
ises, id. § 626A.14. The Act exempts, however, parties to the communication and commu-
nication common carriers or the Federal Communications Commission while discharging
their monitoring obligations. See id. § 626A.02(2). The Act imposes criminal as well as
civil penalties for its violation. Id. §§ 626A.02(1), .13.
17. Minnesota law protects confidential communications arising out of the attorney-
client relationship, the physician-patient relationship, the husband-wife relationship, the
clergyman-penitent relationship, and other relationships. See MINN. STAT. § 595.02 (1976).
These privileges define situations where the interest in protecting private information
outweighs the judiciary's need to know the information for the proper administration of
justice. See, e.g., C. MCCORMICK, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF EVIDENCE § 72, at 152 (2d ed.
E. Cleary 1972); Loevinger, Minnesota Exclusionary Rules of Evidence, Rule VII, Com-
ment, in 38 MINN. STAT. ANN. 108 (West Cum. Supp. 1977). Thus if the communication
is not made in confidence, the privilege does not apply. E.g., Schwartz v. Wenger, 267
.Minn. 40, 42-43, 124 N.W.2d 489, 491-92 (1963). But see Newstrom v. St. Paul & D.
R.R., 61 Minn. 78, 82-83, 63 N.W. 253, 254-55 (1895) (privileged communication between
husband and wife need not be confidential; court apparently equating intimate subject
matter with meaning of "confidential"); Leppla v. Minnesota Tribune Co., 35 Minn. 310,
29 N.W. 127 (1886) (same).
18. See Haynes v. Anderson, 304 Minn. 185, 232 N.W.2d 196 (1975). Privacy must yield,
however, to pretrial discovery which is reasonable in scope. See, e.g., Pinkerton Nat'l
Detective Agency, Inc. v. Stevens, 108 Ga. App. 159, 167-68, 132 S.E.2d 119, 124-25 (1963);
McLain v. Boise Cascade Corp., 271 Ore. 549, 554-55, 533 P.2d 343, 346 (1975).
For a discussion of the Haynes decision, see notes 88-89 infra and accompanying text.
19. E.g., Davis, What Do We Mean by "Right to Privacy"?, 4 S.D.L. REv. 1, 18-20
(1959); Lisle, The Right of Privacy (A Contra View), 19 Ky. L.J. 137, 144 (1931). See also
Kalven, Privacy in Tort Law- Were Warren and Brandeis Wrong?, 31 LAw & CoN'Emp.
PROB. 326, 327 (1966) ("[Tlort law's effort to protect the right of privacy seems to me a
mistake.").
20. E.g., Note, supra note 10, at 541-42; Comment, Assault Upon Solitude-A
Remedy?, 11 SANTA CLARA LAW. 109, 114-16 (1970) (inability of nuisance law to provide
redress for many types of unreasonable intrusions upon solitude and seclusion); see, e.g.,
Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956) (recovery denied to a woman who
had her picture taken while using a tavern bathroom because there is no common law right
of privacy); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § § 652A-652E (1977) (four new torts needed
to protect against unreasonable invasions of privacy).
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focus on statutory' or constitutiona12 rights of privacy, except insofar
21. In Minnesota there are several statutory sanctions for privacy. The two most impor-
tant statutes are the Minnesota Data Privacy Act and the Privacy of Communications
Act. For a discussion of these two statutes, see notes 15-16 supra.
Another group of statutes require various business organizations to keep certain infor-
mation confidential. The business organizations affected include the following:
Debt collection agencies: Records and accounts of a debt collection agency
relating to the individual debtor and his transactions with creditors must be
kept confidential. MINN. STAT. § 332.22(2) (1976). Willful violation of this stat-
ute is a gross misdemeanor. Id. § 332.26.
Health care facilities: Statute provides a bill of rights for patients and resi-
dents of health care facilities. MINN. STAT. § 144.651(5) (1976) states: "Every
patient and resident [of a health care facility] shall have the right to respectful-
ness and privacy as it relates to his medical care program. Case discussion,
consultation, examination, and treatment are confidential and should be con-
ducted discreetly. ... Enforcement of these rights is normally assured by a
grievance procedure, but a civil action is not precluded. See id. § 144.652, as
amended by Act of May 27, 1977, ch. 326, § 1, 1977 Minn. Laws 660.
Hospitals and abortion facilities: Hospital and abortion facilities must keep
abortion reports confidential. MINN. STAT. § 145.413 (1976).
Savings associations: Savings associations are required to keep confidential all
books and records pertaining to accounts and loans of its members. Id. §
51A.11(1).
Telephone and telegraph companies: It is a misdemeanor for an employee of
a telephone or telegraph company entrusted with a telephonic or telegraphic
message to intentionally or negligently disclose its contents to a person other
than the intended receiver. Id. § 609.775(1).
Several of the statutes provide a criminal penalty for their violation. There is an issue,
however, of whether a civil lawsuit can be predicated on violation of these statutes,
creating what might be termed an "invasion of privacy per se."
It is well-settled in Minnesota that where a statute imposes a duty for the protection of
others, a violation of the statute imposes liability for the injuries suffered if they are of a
character which the statute was designed to prevent, e.g., Smith v. Kahler Corp., 297
Minn. 272, 277, 211 N.W.2d 146, 150 (1973); Osborne v. McMasters, 40 Minn. 103, 104,
41 N.W. 543, 543 (1889), and the plaintiff is a member of the class for whose protection
that statute or ordinance was enacted, e.g., Standafer v. First Nat'l Bank, 236 Minn. 123,
126-28, 52 N.W.2d 718, 720-21 (1952), rev'd second appeal on other grounds, 243 Minn.
442, 68 N.W.2d 362 (1955). See also Gibbons v. Yunker, 142 Minn. 99, 170 N.W. 917 (1919)
(statute naming the class protected), aff'd second appeal on other grounds, 145 Minn. 401,
177 N.W. 632 (1920). See generally Note, Negligence- Violation of Statute or Ordinance
as Negligence or Evidence of Negligence-Rules in Minnesota, 19 MINN. L. Rav. 666
(1935).
Violation of a statute is frequently viewed as failure to exercise reasonable care, thereby
proving an element of negligence rather than creating a new tort. Thayer, Public Wrong
and Private Action, 27 HARv. L. REV. 317 passim (1914). Some authorities, however, argue
that certain statutes create an implied civil action sounding in an independent tort. See
Lowndes, Civil Liability Created by Criminal Legislation, 16 MINN. L. Rav. 361 (1932).
See generally Note, The Phenomenon of Implied Private Actions Under Federal Statutes:
Judicial Insight, Legislative Oversight or Legislation by the Judiciary?, 43 FOaDHAM L.
REv. 441 (1974). Whatever the precise nature of the wrong, it seems that the Minnesota
courts might afford civil relief for violation of the privacy statutes, even if violation of the
statute also creates criminal liability. See, e.g., Barsness v. Tiegen, 184 Minn. 188, 190,
238 N.W. 161, 162 (1931).
[Vol. 4
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as the Constitution places a limitation on recovery for tortious invasion
22. Although the existence of a constitutional right of privacy is no longer subject to
serious debate, the scope of the right is still unclear. Various amendments in the Bill of
Rights have been cited as providing a constitutional guarantee to the right of privacy.
First amendment protections of speech are usually viewed as antithetical to privacy.
See notes 253-343 infra and accompanying text. However, the United States Supreme
Court has also used the first amendment to protect the right of anonymity in public
expression. See Talley v. California, 362 U.S. 60 (1960) (ordinance requiring name and
address of handbill sponsor is unconstitutional). It is also clear that the first amendment
protects associational privacy. In NAACP v. Alabama, 357 U.S. 449 (1958), decision on
remand rev'd per curiam, 360 U.S. 240 (1959), a unanimous Court held unconstitutional
Alabama's attempt to compel the disclosure of NAACP membership lists in connection
with the qualification of the NAACP as a foreign corporation. Justice Harlan, writing for
the Court, declared: "This Court has recognized the vital relationship between freedom
to associate and privacy in one's associations . . . . Inviolability of privacy in group
association may in many circumstances be indispensable to preservation of freedom of
association, particularly where a group espouses dissident beliefs." Id. at 462; accord,
Schneider v. Smith, 390 U.S. 17, 24-26 (1968); Shelton v. Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960).
The third amendment prohibitions against peacetime quartering of troops in private
homes has the plain object of protecting privacy by securing "the perfect enjoyment of
that great right of the common law, that a man's house shall be his own castle .... " 2
J. STORY, COMMENTARIES ON THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 621 (4th ed. 1873).
Within the Bill of Rights, the fourth amendment prohibition against unreasonable
searches and seizures is the clearest expression of a constitutional right of privacy. Beaney,
The Constitutional Right to Privacy in the Supreme Court, 1962 Sup. CT. REv. 212, 215.
Both the courts and legal authorities have recognized that privacy interests are protected
by the fourth amendment. See, e.g., Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 350 (1967); State
v. Burch, 284 Minn. 300, 305, 170 N.W.2d 543, 548 (1969); T. COOLEY, THE GENERAL
PRINCIPLES OF CONSTITUTIONAL LAw 218 (2d ed. 1891); 1 B. SCHWARTz, A COMMENTARY ON
THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES: RIGHTS OF THE PERSON 179-80 (1968).
The fourth amendment provides protection only against government searches and sei-
zures. E.g., Burdeau v. McDowell, 256 U.S. 465, 475 (1921). A few courts, however, have
extended fourth amendment-type protections to private searches and seizures as well. See,
e.g., Dietemann v. Time, Inc., 284 F. Supp. 925 (C.D. Cal. 1968), af'd, 449 F.2d 245 (9th
Cir. 1971); Young v. Western & Atl. R.R., 39 Ga. App. 761, 766, 148 S.E. 414, 417 (1929),
afl'd second appeal on other grounds, 43 Ga. App. 257, 158 S.E. 464 (1931); Lebel v.
Swincicki, 354 Mich. 427, 434-41, 93 N.W.2d 281, 284-88 (1958). But see Sutherland v.
Kroger Co., 144 W. Va. 673, 683-84, 110 S.E.2d 716, 723 (1959). See also B. SCHWARTZ,
supra at 198-201 (Elkins v. United States, 364 U.S. 206 (1960) and Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S.
643 (1961) signal a change in the attitude of the Court on fourth amendment protections;
fourth amendment protection should be extended to private searches and seizures).
The fifth amendment's privilege against self-incrimination also provides protection for
privacy by guaranteeing freedom from forced disclosure. See, e.g., Miranda v. Arizona,
384 U.S. 436, 458-61 (1966); Tehan v. United States, 382 U.S. 406, 416 (1966) (the privilege
against self-incrimination reflects the concern of society "for the right of each individual
to be let alone"). But see Schmerber v. California, 384 U.S. 757, 760-65 (1966) (forced
blood-alcohol test is not the type of testimonial compulsion prohibited by the fifth amend-
ment).
The right of privacy has also been said to be a fundamental or natural right within the
meaning of "liberty" protected by the due process clause. See, e.g., Poe v. Ullman, 367
U.S. 497, 515-22 (1961) (Douglas, J., dissenting); Wolf v. Colorado, 338 U.S. 25, 27-28
(1949); York v. Story, 324 F.2d 450, 454-56 (9th Cir. 1963), cert. denied, 376 U.S. 939
(1964); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 197, 50 S.E. 68, 70-71 (1905);
cf. Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 291, 297 P. 91, 93-94 (1931) (privacy is a type of
"liberty" or "pursuit of happiness" guaranteed by the California constitution).
In conclusion, various amendments in the Bill of Rights will protect privacy in certain
19781
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of privacy.
To strike the balance between the individual's right of privacy and the
public's right to know as they exist in a common law context, three
broad issues must be resolved. First, privacy must be defined. This
involves an examination of the sociopsychological concept of an invasion
of privacy.13 Once this concept has been defined, a second issue is to
delineate the elements of a common law action for invasion of privacy.'4
Several authorities, including William Prosser, have defined a common
law tort for invasion of privacy.2 5 The position of this Note, however, is
that the tort has not been defined satisfactorily by Prosser or anyone else
because their definitions are either incomplete or inconsistent with the
concept of privacy as understood by social scientists. Therefore, a new
definition of tortious invasion of privacy will be proposed based on so-
ciopsychological considerations. 6 Finally, the constitutional limitations
and common law defenses on this proposed tort will be examined. 27
II. DEFINING AN INVASION OF PRIVACY IN A SOCIOPSYCHOLOGICAL CONTEXT
Tortious invasion of privacy cannot be defined without an under-
standing of the sociopsychological concept of privacy. One cogent criti-
cism concerning many legal authorities who have examined the right of
privacy is that they have focused on court decisions and legal publica-
tions, often overlooking the theories of privacy enunciated by sociolo-
gists and psychologists. When a court is presented with a question of
contexts. The fact that protections of privacy run thoughout the Bill of Rights led
Justice Douglas, writing for the Court, to conclude in Griswold v. Connecticut, 381 U.S.
479, 484 (1965) that the right of privacy was fundamental to the Bill of Rights: "[Sipecific
guarantees in the Bill of Rights have penumbras, formed by emanations from those guar-
antees that help give them life and substance . . . . [These] create zones of privacy."
Although disagreement over which amendments protect privacy resulted in five concur-
ring opinions and two dissenting opinions, it is agreed that Griswold definitely introduces
a right of privacy into constitutional law. See, e.g., M. SHAPIRO & R. TRESOLINI, AMERICAN
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 731 (4th ed. 1975); A. WESTIN, supra note 1, at 355. But because
Griswold itself involved governmental interference with the right of privacy, it is likely
that a constitutional right of privacy still protects only against governmental intrusions.
See Public Utils. Commn v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) (broadcast of radio programs by
a railway company into its streetcars and buses); B. SCHWARTZ, supra at 178. Furthermore,
attempts to "constitutionalize" the broader common law right of privacy have generally
failed. E.g., McNally v. Pulitzer Pub. Co., 532 F.2d 69, 76-77 & n.9 (8th Cir. 1976).
23. See notes 28-54 infra and accompanying text.
24. See notes 55-252 infra and accompanying text.
25. See notes 122-74 infra and accompanying text.
26. See notes 175-252 infra and accompanying text.
27. See notes 253-360 infra and accompanying text.
28. See, e.g., Bloustein, Privacy as an Aspect of Human Dignity: An Answer to Dean
Prosser, 39 N.Y.U.L. REV. 962 (1964); Gross, The Concept of Privacy, 42 N.Y.U.L. REv.
34 (1967); Prosser, Privacy, 48 CALIF. L. REV. 383 (1960); Warren & Brandeis, The Right
to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 (1890); Note, supra note 10.
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physics, chemistry, or medicine, it turns to the expert physicist, chem-
ist, or physician for insight." Similarly, when the legal profession
attempts to define "invasion of privacy," it should seek assistance from
psychologists and sociologists. 0
Most psychologists and sociologists agree that privacy is a concept
which describes an individual's control over the presentation of his
"self" to others, that is, control over how and when to interact with
others.3 1 This control is dialectic in nature. Privacy encompasses control
both over when social input from others will be received and when social
output will be given to others.3" The sociopyschological forces acting
upon the individual at a given time determine whether he will present
himself to or preserve himself from others.
33
Humans use various mechanisms to achieve the desired amount of
privacy. 4 One is geographical distance from others.3 5 The desired dis-
tances may range from miles to inches, depending on the extent of de-
sired social contact.3 6 Another mechanism is the use of objects and phys-
29. See, e.g., Orwick v. Belshan, 304 Minn. 338, 345-46, 231 N.W.2d 90, 95-96 (1975)
(metallurgical expert); Krueger v. Knutson, 261 Minn. 144, 158-59, 111 N.W.2d 526, 536
(1961) (medical expert); Johnson v. Agerbeck, 247 Minn. 432, 441-43, 77 N.W.2d 539, 545-
46 (1956) (civil engineer).
30. Recently the Minnesota Supreme Court adopted new rules of evidence. MINN. R.
EVID. 702 states:
If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will assist the trier of fact
to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a witness qualified
as an expert by knowledge, skill, training, or education, may testify thereto in
the form of an opinion or otherwise.
Under this rule, it is conceivable that an alleged invasion of privacy could be rebutted by
a sociologist or psychologist who testifies that the facts do not describe injury to privacy
as that concept is understood by the profession. It is well-recognized that the plaintiff's
description of his physical injuries can be challenged by an adverse medical expert. See,
e.g., Shymanski v. Nash, __ Minn. ___, ,251 N.W.2d 854, 857 (1977). This princi-
ple might also be applicable to allow a similar challenge by a sociologist or psychologist
when the injury is mental and allegedly due to an invasion of privacy.
31. See, e.g., Altman, Privacy, 8 ENVIRONMENT & BEHAVIOR 7, 8 (1976); Bates,
Privacy-A Useful Concept?, 42 Soc. FORCES 429, 430 (1964); Schwartz, The Social Psy-
chology of Privacy, 73 AM. J. Soc. 741, 751-52 (1968). See also A. WESTIN, supra note 1,
at 33.
32. Altman, supra note 31, at 11-12; see Simmel, Privacy is Not an Isolated Freedom,
in PRIVACY 72 (J.R. Pennock & J. Chapman eds. 1971).
33. E.g., Pastalan, Privacy as a Behavioral Concept, 45 Soc. Sc. 93, 95-96 (1970).
34. Altman, supra note 31, at 17-22; Pastalan, supra note 33, at 96.
35. See, e.g., R. SOMMER, PERSONAL SPACE 39-57 (1969); Altman, supra note 31, at 20.
See generally R. ARDREY, supra note 1; E. HALL, supra note 1.
36. One anthropologist has proposed that humans have four distance zones. One zone
consists of intimate distance, ranging from bodily contact to 18 inches. E. HALL, supra
note 1, at 116-19. This zone permits communication through smell, heat, and physical
contact as well as through vision and sound. It is not uncommon for a person to feel
discomfort when a stranger is inappropriately inside the intimate sphere.
The second zone consists of personal distance, ranging from 18 inches to four feet. Id.
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ical barriers.37 Obvious examples are telephones, doors, and walls. s Ver-
bal statements are a third means of achieving desired privacy."9 State-
ments such as "come in" and "keep out" often are effective to induce
or avoid social interaction. 0
Desired privacy, however, may not always be equivalent to achieved
privacy. The reaction of others to privacy mechanisms cannot always be
calculated with precision." Thus when achieved privacy exceeds desired
privacy, the person is bored and lonely.2 On the other hand, when
achieved privacy is less than desired privacy, the person experiences an
invasion of privacy."
Descriptions of an invasion of privacy vary among sociologists and
psychologists. Some emphasize that an invasion of privacy occurs when
others "bombard" the individual with more social inputs than he de-
sires," for example, when he is denied physical or psychological seclu-
at 119-20. At this distance there is little, if any, physical contact. Communication at this
distance consists mainly of visual and verbal cues.
The third zone consists of social distance, ranging from four to 12 feet. Id. at 121-23.
Most business and social interaction is conducted at this distance.
The fourth zone is public distance, consisting of 12 feet or more. Id. at 123-25. This
distance is used mainly in formal interactions with persons of higher status.
37. See, e.g., E. GOFFMAN, THE PRESENTATION OF SELF IN EVERYDAY LIFE 106-40 (1959);
Altman, supra note 31, at 21.
38. D. LEE, supra note 3, at 31; Schwartz, supra note 31, at 746-50. For a pictorial
description of objects and their effect on territorial spacing, see E. HALL, supra note 1, at
106-07, plates 13-26.
39. See, e.g., Davis & Oleson, Communal Work and Living: Notes on the Dynamics of
Social Distance and Social Space, 55 Soc. & Soc. RESEARCH 191, 198 (1971) (using a foreign
language can achieve privacy because it prevents others from understanding the conversa-
tion).
40. Altman, supra note 31, at 18.
41. See, e.g., E. GOFFMAN, supra note 37, at 209. Crowding and overpopulation may
render privacy mechanisms largely ineffective. See E. HALL, supra note 1, at 167-68.
42. Altman, supra note 31, at 14; see Schwartz, supra note 31, at 751.
43. Altman, supra note 31, at 14.
44. Irwin Altman, a psychologist, illustrates this phenomenon with a diagram similar
to the following: Control of Inputs from Others
Case I Person ) Others
Case 2 Person ) - Others
Case 3 Person = ) -Others
Case 4 Person -*-)-- Others
See Altman, supra note 31, at 14-17. For a diagram illustrating undesired social outputs,
see note 49 infra. The curved lines around the "Person" symbolize his desired level of
social inputs. The space between the "Person" and the curved lines symbolize desired
social distance. The arrows symbolize the level of actual inputs from others.
In Case 1 the person's desired privacy equals his achieved privacy because he desires a
high input level and he actually receives a high input level. In Case 2 the person's desired
privacy is again equal to his achieved privacy because he desires a low input level and he
actually receives a low input level. Cases 3 and 4 symbolize the situation where the
person's privacy is invaded because actual inputs exceed desired inputs. In Case 3, the
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sion from the presence of other persons or stimuli. 5 The individual
thereby is annoyed by this presence, a phenomenon typical of crowd-
ing." This situation does not involve the unwanted acquisition or disclo-
sure of information about the individual, but rather involves the un-
wanted bombardment of stimuli.
7
Other sociologists and psychologists emphasize that privacy is in-
vaded when the individual is prevented from choosing the conditions
under which information about himself is communicated to others. 8
This situation exists when actual social outputs are forced from the
individual in excess of desired social outputs. 9 The individual thereby
person desires a high level of social input, but his privacy is invaded because he actually
receives an even greater level of social input. In Case 4, the person receives very few social
inputs, but they nevertheless invade his privacy because he desires even fewer social
inputs.
45. Chapin, Some Housing Factors Related to Mental Hygiene, 7 J. Soc. IssuEs 164,
165 (1951) (privacy is invaded when there is interference with the "freedom to be by
oneself" or when the person is denied relief from the "pressures of the presence of others");
Milgram, The Experience of Living in Cities, 167 Sci. 1461, 1462 (1970) (privacy is invaded
when the person is prevented from avoiding "input overload").
46. E. HALL, supra note 1, at 118 (defenses used by adults in crowded buses and sub-
ways to combat intrusions into zones of intimate distance); Pastalan, supra note 33, at
94 (devices used to achieve psychological distance in crowded settings to offset close
physical proximity).
47. See Altman, supra note 31, at 13-17.
48. See Jourard, Some Psychological Aspects of Privacy, 31 LAW & CONTrEMP. PROB. 307,
307 (1966) (privacy is invaded when there is interference with "a person's wish to withhold
from others certain knowledge as to his past and present experience and action and his
intentions for the future"); Pastalan, supra note 33, at 94 (privacy is invaded when there
is interference with "the right of the individual to decide what information about himself
should be communicated to others and under what conditions"); Schwartz, supra note 31,
at 747 (privacy is invaded when the "self has lost control of its audience; it can no longer
regulate who may and who may not have access to the property and information that index
its depths").
49. Psychologist Irwin Altman illustrates this phenomenon with a diagram similar to
the following: Control of Outputs to Others
Case 1 Person - ) Others
Case 2 Person-") Others
Case 3 Person - Others
Case 4 Person"--. Others
See Altman, supra note 31, at 14-17. For a diagram illustrating undesired social inputs,
see note 44 supra. The curved lines around the "Person" symbolize his desired level of
social outputs. The space between the "Person" and the curved lines symbolize desired
social distance. The arrows symbolize the level of actual outputs to others.
In Case 1 the person's desired privacy equals his achieved privacy because the person
desires a high output level and achieves a high output level. Also, in Case 2 the person's
desired privacy equals his achieved privacy because he desires low outputs and achieves
low outputs. In Cases 3 and 4 the person's privacy is invaded because achieved social
outputs exceed desired social outputs, thereby causing unwanted social interaction with
others. In Case 3 the person desires a high level of social output, but he achieves an even
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is annoyed from the "unwanted revelation" of the self to others, such
as when he loses his anonymity in a crowd 0 or is the subject of unwanted
revelations about his intimate relationships." This situation does not
involve the unwanted bombardment of stimuli, but rather the unwanted
acquisition or disclosure of private information with its attendant effect
on social interaction."
Finally, there are sociologists and psychologists who combine these
two theories into one.53 Psychologist Irwin Altman states: "We hypoth-
esize a two-way privacy process involving control over social inputs and
social outputs. First, [privacy] includes control over inputs from per-
sons and stimuli outside the self. . . . Privacy can also be viewed from
the perspective of [controlling] outputs from the self.""
In recognition of these two theories-"bombardment" and "unwanted
revelation"-and the combined-theory approach taken by some, this
Note defines the sociopsychological concept of invasion of privacy as
follows:
Privacy is invaded:
(1) when the individual is subjected to unwanted social inputs and
stimuli, creating annoyance from the presence of persons or things
which prevent the individual from achieving his desired degree of seclu-
sion; or
(2) when the individual is subjected to unwanted social outputs, cre-
ating annoyance from the unauthorized acquisition or disclosure of
private information concerning the individual which results in unde-
sired social interaction.
higher level. In Case 4 the person achieves a low level of social output, but his privacy is
invaded because he desires an even lower level.
50. See THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 402-08 (K. Wolff ed. 1950) (concept of the
"stranger" who remains relatively anonymous); A. WESTIN, supra note 1, at 31; Pastalan,
supra note 33, at 96 (description of environmental factors, antecedent factors, and behav-
ior associated with the desire to avoid personal identification and the responsibility for
social conduct).
51. See R. PARK & E. BURGESS, INTRODUCTION TO THE SCIENCE OF SOCIOLOGY 284-87 (1921)
(discussion of difference between distant secondary social contacts and close primary
social contacts which include intimate relationships); Pastalan, supra note 33, at 96 (de-
scription of environmental factors, antecedent factors, and behavior associated with the
need to have close, relaxed, and frank relationships).
52. See Altman, supra note 31, at 15-16.
53. See, e.g., Bates, supra note 31, at 429 (privacy is invaded when there is interference
with "a person's feeling that others should be excluded from something which is of concern
to him"); A. Rapaport, Some Perspectives on Human Use and Organization of Space
(May 1972) (paper presented at Australian Association of Social Anthropologists, Mel-
bourne, Australia) (privacy is invaded when there is interference with "the ability to
control interaction, to have options, devices and mechanisms to prevent unwanted inter-
action and to achieve desired interaction"), definition of privacy reprinted in Altman,
supra note 31, at 8. See also THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SIMMEL 320-24 (K. Wolff ed. 1950)
(control over presentation and withdrawal of a person's "intellectual private-property").
54. Altman, supra note 31, at 14 (emphasis in original).
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This does not, of course, define tortious invasion of privacy. Rather,
it defines the sociopsychological concept of an invasion of privacy. It
provides a basis, however, for the analysis of the legal protection given
privacy. The problem of defining a common law right of privacy, there-
fore, should be solved in a manner consistent with this broader theoreti-
cal concept.
Ill. A COMMON LAW RIGHT OF PRIVACY
Although tortious invasion of privacy was not recognized at early
common law,55 most jurisdictions have now recognized the tort.5 Only
three states have expressly rejected it." The Minnesota Federal District
55. E.g., Elmhurst v. Shoreham Hotel, 58 F. Supp. 484, 485 (D.D.C. 1945), aff'd sub
nom., Elmhurst v. Pearson, 153 F.2d 467 (D.C. Cir. 1946); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App.
285, 287, 297 P. 91, 92 (1931); Roberson v. Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 544,
64 N.E. 442, 443 (1902). But see Prince Albert v. Strange, 64 Eng. Rep. 293, 312 (V.C.
1849) (the common law protects private sentiments contained in writings); Millar v.
Taylor, 98 Eng. Rep. 201 (K.B. 1769) (same).
56. See, e.g., Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305, 307-09 (D.D.C. 1948); Smith v.
Doss, 251 Ala. 250, 252-53, 37 So. 2d 118, 120 (1948); Reed v. Real Detective Pub. Co., 63
Ariz. 294, 304-05, 162 P.2d 133, 138 (1945); Olan Mills, Inc. v. Dodd, 234 Ark. 495, 353
S.W.2d 22 (1962); Melvin v. Reid, 112 Cal. App. 285, 297 P. 91 (1931); Rugg v. McCarty,
173 Colo. 170, 175-76, 476 P.2d 753, 754-56 (1970); Korn v. Rennison, 21 Conn. Supp. 400,
401-03, 156 A.2d 476, 477-78 (1959); Barbieri v. News-Journal Co., 56 Del. 67, 69, 189 A.2d
773, 774 (1963); Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 207-15, 20 So. 2d 243, 247-53 (1944) (en
banc), rev'd second appeal on other grounds en banc, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So. 2d 635 (1947);
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 193-95, 50 S.E. 68, 69-81 (1905);
Fergerstrom v. Hawaiian Ocean View Estates, 50 Hawaii 374, 441 P.2d 141 (1968); Eick
v. Perk Dog Food Co., 347 Il. App. 293, 294-306, 106 N.E.2d 742, 743-48 (1952); Continen-
tal Optical Co. v. Reed, 119 Ind. App. 643, 646-51, 86 N.E.2d 306, 308-09 (1949) (in banc);
Bremmer v. Journal-Tribune Pub. Co., 247 Iowa 817, 821-22, 76 N.W.2d 762, 765 (1956);
Kunz v. Allen, 102 Kan. 883, 172 P. 532 (1918); Foster-Milburn Co. v. Chinn, 134 Ky. 424,
432, 120 S.W. 364, 366 (1909); Itzkovitch v. Whitaker, 115 La. 479, 480-81, 39 So. 499, 501
(1905); Carr v. Watkins, 227 Md. 578, 586-88, 177 A.2d 841, 845-46 (1962); Pallas v.
Crowley, Milner & Co., 322 Mich. 411, 33 N.W.2d 911 (1948), a/f'd second appeal, 334
Mich. 282, 54 N.W.2d 595 (1952); Martin v. Dorton, 210 Miss. 668, 50 So. 2d 391 (1951);
Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1204, 159 S.W.2d 291, 293 (1942); Welsh v. Roehm,
125 Mont. 517, 522-25, 241 P.2d 816, 819 (1952); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107,
206 A.2d 239 (1964); Vanderbilt v. Mitchell, 72 N.J. Eq. 910, 67 A. 97 (1907); Blount v.
TD Pub. Corp., 77 N.M. 384, 387-89, 423 P.2d 421, 424 (1967); Flake v. Greensboro News
Co., 212 N.C. 780, 790-93, 195 S.E. 55, 63-64 (1938); Housh v. Peth, 165 Ohio St. 35, 38-
39, 133 N.E.2d 340, 343 (1956); Hinish v. Meier & Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 502-05, 113
P.2d 438, 446-47 (1941); In re Mack, 386 Pa. 251, 259-60, 126 A.2d 679, 682-83 (1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 1002 (1957); Holloman v. Life Ins. Co., 192 S.C. 454, 458-59, 7 S.E.2d
169, 171 (1940); Truxes v. Kenco Enterprises, Inc., 80 S.D. 104, 107-09, 119 N.W.2d 914,
916-17 (1963); Langford v. Vanderbilt Univ., 199 Tenn. 389, 401-04, 287 S.W.2d 32, 38
(1956) (by implication); Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tex. 1973); Roach v.
Harper, 143 W. Va. 869, 871-77, 105 S.E.2d 564, 568 (1958).
57. See Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 524-25, 73 N.W.2d 803, 806 (1955);
Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 43, 73 A. 97, 109 (1909); Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272
Wis. 430, 434, 75 N.W.2d 925, 927 (1956). The Nebraska and Wisconsin courts explicitly
left creation of the tort to the legislature.
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Court has decided at least four cases brought for invasion of privacy, 58
yet the Minnesota Supreme Court has neither rejected nor recognized a
common law right of privacy. The Minnesota Supreme Court has de-
cided only one case brought specifically for tortious invasion of privacy:
Hendry v. Conner.-9
In Hendry, a 1975 case, the plaintiff had taken her child to a hospital
for medical treatment. While waiting to have the child admitted, an
employee of the credit department told the plaintiff that her child could
not be treated unless a bill for prior treatment was paid, referring to the
fact that the debt had been discharged in bankruptcy. Because a num-
ber of people in the waiting room overheard the conversation, the plain-
tiff brought an action for invasion of privacy. The Minnesota Supreme
Court, applying the analysis of William Prosser," held that the plaintiff
did not state a cause of action because bankruptcy is not a private fact 6
and the disclosure to the few people present was insufficient publicity."
The court, therefore, found it unnecessary to determine whether a com-
mon law right of privacy should be recognized in Minnesota."
58. The Minnesota Federal District Court denied the claim for invasion of privacy in
each of the four cases. In Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D.
Minn. 1948) the plaintiff brought an action for invasion of privacy when a photographer
took his picture in a courtroom during child custody proceedings. The court considered
whether Minnesota would recognize a common law right of privacy, and held a cause of
action was not stated because the proceedings were newsworthy.
A similar case was presented by Hurley v. Northwest Pubs., Inc., 273 F. Supp. 967 (D.
Minn. 1967), aff'd per curiam, 398 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968), in which defendant newspaper
published a condensed but essentially accurate report of a complaint filed in a lawsuit
brought by the administrator of an estate against the plaintiffs, their mother, and four
sisters. The complaint alleged that they had conspired to unduly influence the decedent's
transfer of security proceeds to them. The claim for invasion of privacy was denied because
the published statements were derived from a public record.
In the unpublished case of Benner v. National Broadcasting Co., Civil No. 4-72-67 (D.
Minn. June 18, 1975), a St. Paul branch president of the NAACP brought an action
against NBC after it displayed in a television broadcast an index card bearing plaintiff's
name which was part of a file prepared by the Army for domestic intelligence purposes.
Although the court found that this constituted a prima facie case for invasion of privacy,
it ordered summary judgment for NBC on the basis of first amendment protections.
Finally, in Morris v. Danna, 411 F. Supp. 1300 (D. Minn. 1976), aff'd per curiam, 547
F.2d 437 (8th Cir. 1977), the plaintiff brought an action against an assistant county
attorney and a county welfare fraud unit for invasion of privacy based on the publication
of private facts which allegedly could have been obtained only from his welfare records.
The court dismissed for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the narrow constitu-
tional right of privacy was not violated and no other federal question was involved.
See also Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970) (misappropriation
of a professional baseball player's name may be enjoined even though it does not consti-
tute an invasion of privacy), discussed in text accompanying notes 164-66 infra.
59. 303 Minn. 317, 226 N.W.2d 921 (1975) (per curiam).
60. See id. at 318, 226 N.W.2d at 922.
61. Id. at 319, 226 N.W.2d at 923.
62. Id.
63. See id.
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Two broad questions arise from the Hendry decision. Because the
court in Hendry did not refute a common law right of privacy, the first
question is whether the tort should be recognized in Minnesota. If the
tort should be recognized, the second question involves a determination
of its elements. These questions are discussed below.
A. Should Privacy Be Protected by a Common Law Tort?
Common law torts evolved to protect important personal and social
interests. Some interests might not be sufficiently important to deserve
the sanction of a common law tort. For example, ingratitude does not
give rise to tortious liability." Thus, one issue confronting the Minne-
sota court is whether privacy is a sufficiently important interest to qual-
ify for tort sanction.
Privacy may be important to the individual for several reasons. First,
it protects personal autonomy, individuality, and personal choice. 5 Pri-
vacy also provides emotional release from playing social roles, allowing
the individual to deviate from social norms without being held account-
able for it.66 In addition, privacy affords self-evaluation because it allows
the individual to process and organize accumulated information and
social stimuli. 7 Moreover, privacy allows the individual to engage in
confidential interaction with trusted friends.
In contrast to value for the individual, privacy also has political and
social value. It furthers democratic values because it protects autonomy,
individuality, and freedom of association in organizations advocating
unconventional ideas.69 In addition, the sanctity of social norms is pre-
64. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAw OF ToRTS § 4, at 21 (4th ed. 1971).
65. See Lasswell, The Threat to Privacy, in CONFLICT OF LOYALTIES 135-36 (R. MacIver
ed. 1952); Rossiter, The Pattern of Liberty, in ASPECTS OF LBErTY 17 (M. Konvitz & C.
Rossiter eds. 1958). Individuality and personal choice are furthered because privacy allows
the person to withdraw from the manipulation or domination of others. A. WESTIN, supra
note 1, at 33.
The Minnesota Supreme Court has also recognized that privacy serves personal auton-
omy. In Price v. Sheppard, - Minn. - 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976), the court was
confronted with the issue of whether involuntary electroshock treatment to persons com-
mitted for mental illness was an unconstitutional invasion of privacy. In discussing the
nature of privacy the court said: "At the core of the privacy decisions, in our judgment,
is the concept of personal autonomy-the notion that the Constitution reserves to the
individual, free of governmental intrusion, certain fundamental decisions about how he
or she will conduct his or her life." Id. at -, 239 N.W.2d at 910.
66. Pastalan, supra note 33, at 93. See generally E. GorFMAN, supra note 37, at 128-82
(persons have "backstage" areas in which they relax from playing social roles).
67. Bates, supra note 31, at 433; Pastalan, supra note 33, at 94.
68. A. WESTIN, supra note 1, at 37-39; Pastalan, supra note 33, at 94; see Jourard, Self-
Disclosure and Other-Cathexis, 59 J. ABNORMAL & SOC. PSYCH. 428 (1959) (study showing
that persons disclose more confidential matters to another if the other reciprocates with
similar disclosures).
69. A. WESTiN, supra note 1, at 34; see NAACP v. Alabama, 377 U.S. 288 (1964) (state
19781
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served when harmless deviation occurs in a private setting, invisible to
the public eye. 0 Third, privacy helps to maintain the division between
groups.7' Privacy may even preserve important relationships by allowing
withdrawal from those relationships when sporadic frictions and con-
flicts occur.1
2
The cumulative value of these interests would appear sufficiently
important for the sanction of a common law tort. Courts in at least
thirty-three states have so concluded.7" Even the three courts which
have rejected a common law right of privacy have not concluded that
privacy is undeserving of legal protection; instead, they concluded that
because an action for invasion of privacy was not recognized at early
common law,7" adoption of the tort would be an improper exercise of
judicial power. Thus, even if the Minnesota Supreme Court decides that
privacy deserves common law protection, the court must also decide
whether it is appropriate to adopt a tort which was not recognized at
early common law.
Presently, Nebraska, 5 Rhode Island," and Wisconsin" are the only
states which reject a common law tort for invasion of privacy. The
reasons stated for rejection were that first, a right of privacy had not yet
found an "abiding place" in the state's jurisprudence" and that second,
the creation of a right unknown at common law is a task for the legisla-
ture.70
of Alabama cannot compel the NAACP to disclose a list of its members); Shelton v.
Tucker, 364 U.S. 479 (1960) (school board cannot compel teachers to disclose all groups
in which they are members). See also Moore & Tumin, Some Social Functions of
Ignorance, 14 AM. Soc. REv. 787, 792 (1949) (privacy is necessary in competitive economies
to assure confidential business decisions).
70. Moore & Tumin, supra note 69, at 791; Schwartz, supra note 31, at 744.
71. J. HONIGMANN, THE WORLD OF MAN 349 (1959); Schwartz, supra note 31, at 742-43.
72. See Rosenblatt & Budd, Territoriality and Privacy in Married and Unmarried Co-
habiting Couples, 97 J. Soc. PSYCH. 67 (1965) (hypothesis that married couples are more
territorial than unmarried couples because a long-term commitment requires defined
territoriality to minimize the frictions of living together); Schwartz, supra note 31, at 741-
42.
73. See cases cited in note 56 supra.
74. See cases cited in note 55 supra.
75. See Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 73 N.W.2d 803 (1955).
76. See Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909).
77. See Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 75 N.W.2d 925 (1956); State ex rel. Disten-
feld v. Neelen, 255 Wis. 214, 218, 38 N.W.2d 703, 704-05 (1949); Judevine v. Benzies-
Montanye Fuel & Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 525-27, 269 N.W. 295, 301-02 (1936). See
generally Comment, The Right of Privacy, 1952 Wis. L. Rav. 507.
However, the Wisconsin court does allow recovery for intentional and outrageous inflic-
tion of mental distress, which conceivably could be caused by an invasion of privacy. See
Alsteen v. Gehl, 21 Wis. 2d 349, 356-61, 124 N.W.2d 312, 316-18 (1963).
78. See Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 43, 73 A. 97, 109 (1909); Judevine v.
Benzies-Montanye Fuel & Warehouse Co., 222 Wis. 512, 526, 269 N.W. 295, 302 (1936).
79. See Brunson v. Ranks Army Store, 161 Neb. 519, 525, 73 N.W.2d 803, 806 (1955);
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The first reason probably is not applicable in Minnesota. The Minne-
sota court may have recognized privacy interests as early as 1890 in the
case of Moore v. Rugg.'" In that case, the defendant photographer had
given the picture of a customer to another person without the customer's
consent. The customer brought an action for damages. The Minnesota
Supreme Court affirmed an order overruling a general demurrer, stating
that implicit in the customer's contract with the defendant was an
understanding that the picture would be used only for purposes author-
ized by the customer."1 Although the court did not analyze the use of
the customer's picture in terms of an invasion of privacy, several courts
have stated that such use of a person's picture constitutes the tort of
"appropriation"8" or interference with a person's "right of publicity." 83
These torts often protect against the usurpation of a celebrity's pecuni-
ary rights in his name and picture." In some instances, however, the
torts may provide protection to privacy," and therefore the Minnesota
court in Moore may have recognized privacy interests as well as contract
rights.
A clearer instance of protection to privacy appears in Lesch v. Great
Northern Railway,8 a 1906 case. While the plaintiff was home and her
husband was away, the defendant's employees entered the plaintiff's
house without permission and searched all the rooms for stolen tools.
After they left she developed severe mental distress and was confined
to bed for two weeks. The Minnesota Supreme Court affirmed a judg-
ment for the plaintiff because an unlawful or wanton invasion of the
peaceful enjoyment of her home was "a tort." 87 Although the court did
not define the tort, the essence of the wrong was undoubtedly the inva-
Yoeckel v. Samonig, 272 Wis. 430, 434-35, 75 N.W.2d 925, 926-27 (1956). In Yoeckel,
defendant photographed plaintiff while she was using a tavern bathroom. Defendant then
distributed the picture among the tavern patrons. Plaintiff's common law claim for inva-
sion of privacy was rejected in view of the Wisconsin legislature's failure to pass a bill
which had been introduced to create a right of privacy. This has been described as "truly
an appalling decision." See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804
n.20 (4th ed. 1971).
At one time the Texas courts also rejected a common law right of privacy on the grounds
that creation of the right was for the legislature. See Milner v. Red River Valley Pub. Co.,
249 S.W.2d 227, 229 (Tex. Ct. Civ. App. 1952), discussed in Seavey, Can Texas Courts
Protect Newly-Discovered Interests?, 31 TEx. L. REv. 309 (1953). The Texas Supreme
Court has since retreated from that position and it now recognizes a common law right of
privacy. See Billings v. Atkinson, 489 S.W.2d 858, 860 (Tex. 1973).
80. 44 Minn. 28, 46 N.W. 141 (1890).
81. Id. at 29, 46 N.W. at 141.
82. See notes 154-56 infra and accompanying text.
83. See note 168 infra; note 174 infra and accompanying text.
84. See notes 157-68 infra and accompanying text.
85. See notes 169-74 infra and accompanying text.
86. 97 Minn. 503, 106 N.W. 955 (1906).
87. Id. at 506, 106 N.W. at 957.
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sion of her privacy.
More recently, the Minnesota Supreme Court has expressly relied
upon a right of privacy to protect against intrusive pretrial discovery.
In Haynes v. Anderson," the defendant in a personal injury action
sought discovery of the plaintiff's psychological condition through use
of the Minnesota Multiphasic Personality Inventory, a series of ex-
tremely personal and intimate questions. The district court ordered
discovery and plaintiff sought a writ of prohibition from the supreme
court. The supreme court held that submission to the test could be
compelled only if several conditions were satisfied, one of which was that
the probative value of the anticipated answers outweigh any unneces-
sary intrusion into the plaintiff's privacy. 9
The Minnesota Supreme Court also has used a constitutional right of
privacy90 as a basis for protection against unwanted electroshock ther-
apy9' and unreasonable searches and seizures.2 Furthermore, the Min-
nesota Legislature has enacted the Data Privacy Act, which limits the
use of data collected by state agencies, 3 and the Privacy of Communica-
tions Act, which protects against unauthorized wiretapping and bug-
ging.
94
These developments indicate the right of privacy has been given rec-
ognition in Minnesota law. Therefore, the tort of invasion of privacy
probably cannot be rejected on the ground that the right of privacy,
unknown at early common law, has not been given an "abiding place"
in Minnesota jurisprudence.
The Minnesota court might, however, adopt the second reason for
rejecting the tort and hold that creation of a new right is a task for the
legislature and not the judiciary. 5 Case law seems to indicate, however,
88. 304 Minn. 185, 232 N.W.2d 196 (1975).
89. Id. at 190, 232 N.W.2d at 200.
90. For a discussion of the constitutional right of privacy, see note 22 supra.
91. In the recent case of Price v. Sheppard, - Minn. - , 239 N.W.2d 905 (1976)
the Minnesota Supreme Court was confronted with the issue of whether involuntary
electroshock treatment to persons committed for mental illness was an unconstitutional
infringement upon their privacy. The court found it unnecessary to resolve this issue
because it held that defendant, the medical director of a Minnesota security hospital, was
immune from liability. The court indicated, however, that resolution of the constitutional
issue would depend upon whether electroshock was a "necessary and reasonable" means
for the state to fulfill its duty of protecting the well-being of citizens who are incapable of
acting for themselves. Id. at __, 239 N.W.2d at 910-12.
92. See, e.g., State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 177 N.W.2d 800 (1970); State v. Burch,
284 Minn. 300, 305, 170 N.W.2d 543, 548 (1969); State ex rel. Branchaud v. Hedman, 269
Minn. 375, 378-79, 130 N.W.2d 628, 630 (1964), cert. dismissed per stipulation, 381 U.S.
907 (1965). See also Roberts v. Whitaker, 287 Minn. 452, 178 N.W.2d 869 (1970) (subpoena
duces tecum issued by a public examiner cannot involve an unnecessary invasion of
privacy).
93. See note 15 supra and accompanying text.
94. See note 16 supra and accompanying text.
95. See note 79 supra and accompanying text.
[Vol. 4
18
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss1/5
TORTIOUS INVASION OF PRIVACY
that the Minnesota court will not defer to the legislature. In formulating
common law concepts of tort, the Minnesota Supreme Court has set
forth the following principle:"
Novelty of an asserted right and lack of common-law precedent
therefor are no reasons for denying its existence. The common law does
not consist of absolute, fixed, and inflexible rules, but rather of broad
and comprehensive principles based on justice, reason, and common
sense. It is of judicial origin and promulgation. Its principles have been
determined by the social needs of the community and have changed
with changes in such needs. These principles are susceptible of adapta-
tion to new conditions, interests, relations, and usages as the progress
of society may require.
Other authorities agree that the common law is based on social cus-
toms, and thus a court may change or fill voids in the common law as
the needs and customs of society change. 7 In accordance with this prin-
ciple, the Minnesota court has changed those common law concepts of
tort which are no longer useful to achieve justice in today's society. The
Minnesota court has abolished the government's tort immunity,", abol-
ished intrafamily tort immunity," removed the distinction between the
duty of care owed by a landowner to a licensee and that owed to an
invitee,9 ° and removed the requirement of common liability in certain
actions for contribution against an employer.'9 ' In the context of prod-
ucts liability, the Minnesota court has adopted a theory of strict liability
96. Miller v. Monsen, 228 Minn. 400, 406, 37 N.W.2d 543, 547 (1949); accord, e.g.,
Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 433-34, 161 N.W.2d 631, 632-33 (1968). But see Ameri-
can Auto. Ins. Co. v. Moiling, 239 Minn. 74, 86, 57 N.W.2d 847, 854-55 (1953), in which
the Minnesota court said that it would not change the common law requirement of com-
mon liability for contribution or interspousal immunity because they are as well-
established as statutes. Yet the court has even retreated from this stance by modifying
the requirement of common liability for contribution, see note 101 infra and accompanying
text, and by abolishing interspousal immunity, see note 99 infra and accompanying text.
97. See, e.g., 1 W. BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *68-70; R. POUND, THE SPIRIT OF THE
COMMON LAW 166-86 (1921). See also Stabs v. City of Tower, 229 Minn. 552, 565, 40
N.W.2d 362, 371 (1949) (although the common law is flexible, courts should not adopt
rules which the legislature rejected); Lenhoff, Extra-Legislational Progress of Law: The
Place of the Judiciary in the Shaping of New Law, 28 NEB. L. REV. 542, 552 (1949) (courts
may fill voids in the common law, provided a statute is not contravened).
98. See Nieting v. Blondell, __ Minn. - , 235 N.W.2d 597 (1975) (abolition of state
tort immunity); Spanel v. Mounds View School Dist. No. 621, 264 Minn. 279, 118 N.W.2d
795 (1962) (abolition of municipal tort immunity).
99. See Beaudette v. Frana, 285 Minn. 366, 173 N.W.2d 416 (1969) (abolition of inter-
spousal immunity); Silesky v. Kelman, 281 Minn. 431, 161 N.W.2d 631 (1968) (abolition
of parent's immunity from suit by child); Baits v. Baits, 273 Minn. 419, 426-34, 142
N.W.2d 66, 71-75 (1966) (rejecting doctrine of child's immunity from suit by parent).
100. See Peterson v. Balach, 294 Minn. 161, 199 N.W.2d 639 (1972).
101. See Lambertson v. Cincinnati Corp., - Minn. 257 N.W.2d 679, 688
(1977).
19781
19
et al.: Tortious Invasion of Privacy: Minnesota as a Model
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1978
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
in tort,0 2 a theory unknown at early common law.'03
It therefore appears likely that the right of privacy deserves the pro-
tection of a common law tort and that the Minnesota court will so hold
if it is presented with the proper facts. If the court decides to adopt this
common law tort, one of the difficult problems confronting it will be to
define its elements. Although solutions to this problem have been sug-
gested by William Prosser and other authorities, a different solution will
be proposed by this Note.
B. Elements of an Action for Tortious Invasion of Privacy
Early common law often provides assistance in defining torts. Unfor-
tunately, modern courts attempting to define tortious invasion of pri-
vacy are denied this assistance because the action was not recognized
at early common law.' 4 This void prompted Samuel Warren and Louis
Brandeis in 1890 to write one of the first articles advocating and outlin-
ing a common law right of privacy. 05 They emphasized that the protec-
tion afforded to private life should not be based on property interests,
but rather on the inviolate nature of personality.' 6 At the time, this
emphasis represented a significant departure from judicial attitudes,
particularly in the courts of equity, which were cognizant of property
rights but reluctant to develop new personal rights.' 7 In fact, it is not
surprising that early American decisions involving privacy issues often
were decided in part on theories of breach of trust,'00 breach of con-
tract,'00 or interference with other types of property interests." Thus,
early American precedent contributed little toward advancement of an
independent tort for invasion of privacy."'
102. See McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 337-40, 154 N.W.2d 488, 499-
501 (1967), aff'd second appeal on other grounds per curiam, 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d
523 (1968).
103. See, e.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF ToRTs § 96, at 641-42 (4th ed.
1971).
104. See note 55 supra and accompanying text.
105. See Warren & Brandeis, supra note 28.
106. Id. at 205.
107. See, e.g., Atkinson v. John E. Doherty & Co., 121 Mich. 372, 80 N.W. 285 (1899);
Henry v. Cherry & Webb, 30 R.I. 13, 73 A. 97 (1909). One reason the early courts were
reluctant to create an independent tort for invasion of privacy is because the injury to
privacy is purely mental and not connected to any physical injury from which the state
of mind can be inferred. Davis, supra note 19, at 6.
108. See, e.g., Corliss v. E.W. Walker Co., 57 F. 434, 436 (1st Cir. 1893), rev'd second
hearing on other grounds, 64 F. 280 (1st Cir. 1894); Douglas v. Stokes, 149 Ky. 506, 508,
149 S.W. 849, 850 (1912).
109. See, e.g., Moore v. Rugg, 44 Minn. 28, 46 N.W. 141 (1890), discussed in text
accompanying notes 80-85 supra.
110. See, e.g., Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 660, 134 S.W. 1076, 1079 (1911);
Edison v. Edison Polyform & Mfg. Co., 73 N.J. Eq. 136, 67 A. 392 (1907).
111. Note, The Right to Privacy Today, 43 HARv. L. REv. 297, 298 (1929); see Davis,
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Modern courts have been assisted, however, by the many authorities
who have attempted to define the right of privacy."' The most popular
approach is that proposed by William Prosser. Although his approach
has been subjected to much criticism," 3 it has been adopted by several
courts"' and is used in the Restatement (Second) of Torts."' An exami-
nation of early cases sanctioning privacy led Prosser to conclude that the
right of privacy was protected not by one tort, but rather by a complex
of four torts."' Prosser labels the four torts as intrusion,"7 public disclo-
sure of private facts,"' false light in the public eye,"' and appropria-
tion.'2 0
When the Minnesota Supreme Court decided Hendry v. Conner, it
relied rather heavily upon Prosser's approach.' Although the court did
not adopt his approach, the use of it implicitly indicates a willingness
to do so. In light of that approval, it is important to determine whether
that approach would be compatible with existing Minnesota law and
also serve the purpose of protecting privacy. It is submitted that Pros-
supra note 19, at 3-4; Lisle, supra note 19, at 142. But see Pavesich v. New England Life
Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 50 S.E. 68 (1905) (recognition of independent right of privacy).
112. See, e.g., A. WESTIN, supra note 1, at 7 (the right to withdraw from society);
Bloustein, supra note 28, at 1003 (emphasizing human dignity and individuality); Fried,
Privacy, 77 YALE L.J. 475, 482 (1968) (privacy is not merely an absence of information
about ourselves in the mind of others, it is control over information); Gross, supra note
28, at 35-36 (the condition of human life in which acquaintance with one's personal affairs
is limited); Ludwig, "Peace of Mind" in 48 Pieces vs. Uniform Right of Privacy, 32 MINN.
L. REv. 734, 764 (1948) (intrusion upon or disclosure of another's private activities);
Moore, A Newspaper's Risks in Reporting "Facts" from Presumably Reliable Sources: A
Study in the Practical Application of the Right of Privacy, 22 S.C.L. REv. 1 (1970) (right
to prevent embarrassment from publication of a matter which is not newsworthy); Parker,
A Definition of Privacy, 27 RUTGERS L. REv. 275, 280 (1974) ("control over who can sense
us").
113. See, e.g.., Bloustein, supra note 28 (privacy protects human dignity and individu-
ality; Prosser is misguided in stating it protects mental, proprietary, or reputational
interests); Gross, supra note 28, at 46-51 (Prosser fails to identify the correct elements of
tortious invasion of privacy because he fails to distinguish the single interest which is
harmed); Note, supra note 10, at 539-41.
114. See, e.g., Guthridge v. Pen-Mod, Inc., 239 A.2d 709, 711 (Del. Super. 1967); Dotson
v. McLaughlin, 216 Kan. 201, 207-08, 531 P.2d 1, 6 (1975); Earp v. City of Detroit, 16
Mich. App. 271, 276-77, 167 N.W.2d 841, 845 (1969); Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H.
107, 110-11, 206 A.2d 239, 241 (1964); Shibley v. Time, Inc., 69 Ohio Op. 2d 495, 497, 321
N.E.2d 791, 794 (C.P. 1974), aff'd, 74 Ohio Op. 2d 101, 341 N.E.2d 337 (Ct. App. 1975);
Vogel v. W.T. Grant Co., 458 Pa. 124, 129-30, 327 A.2d 133, 135-36 (1974).
115. Compare RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652A-652E (1977) with W. PROSSER,
HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804-14 (4th ed. 1971).
116. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804 (4th ed. 1971).
117. Id. at 807-09.
118. Id. at 809-12.
119. Id. at 812-14.
120. Id. at 804-07.
121. See notes 59-63 supra and accompanying text.
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ser's approach, consisting of four torts to protect a single interest, is
overinclusive by protecting interests other than privacy. This Note,
therefore, will propose a new approach to tortious invasion of privacy.
The elements of the proposed tort will be based in part, however, on
those aspects of Prosser's approach which are consistent with the socio-
psychological concept of privacy. For this reason, both the strengths and
weaknesses of Prosser's approach must be examined.
1. The Strengths and Weaknesses of Prosser's Approach
Prosser asserts that the common law right of privacy is protected by
four torts: intrusion, public disclosure of private facts, false light in the
public eye, and appropriation. 22 His approach results from a categoriza-
tion of statutes and judicial decisions relating to privacy rather than a
theoretical analysis of a common law right of privacy.' He cannot be
criticized for declaring that the torts are actionable in some jurisdic-
tions, ' 24 but he can be criticized for characterizing them as invasions
of privacy. An examination of the four torts will demonstrate that
Prosser's approach does not satisfactorily define the conduct which
causes an invasion of privacy.
a. Intrusion; Public Disclosure of Private Facts
One tort which Prosser classifies as an invasion of privacy is
"intrusion." The tort is defined as follows: "One who intentionally in-
trudes, physically or otherwise, upon the solitude or seclusion of another
or his private affairs or concerns, is subject to liability to the other for
invasion of his privacy, if the intrusion would be highly offensive to a
reasonable person.' ' 21 A second tort which Prosser classifies as an inva-
sion of privacy is "public disclosure of private facts." He defines this tort
as "publicity, of a highly objectionable kind, given to private informa-
tion about the plaintiff ... *,126
Essentially, these two torts characterize the situations which involve
the sociopsychological phenomenon of an invasion of privacy. This Note
has proceeded on the assumption that this phenomenon occurs in two
broad situations: 1 7
122. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117 (4th ed. 1971).
123. See id. at 804.
124. See, e.g., Linehan v. Linehan, 134 Cal. App. 2d 250, 285 P.2d 326 (1955) (false
light); Newcomb Hotel Co. v. Corbett, 27 Ga. App. 365, 108 S.E. 309 (1921) (intrusion);
Selsman v. Universal Photo Books, Inc., 18 App. Div. 2d 151, 238 N.Y.S.2d 686 (1963)
(appropriation); Tollefson v. Price, 247 Ore. 398, 430 P.2d 990 (1967) (in banc) (public
disclosure of private fact).
125. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
126. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 809 (4th ed. 1971).
127. See text at 174 supra.
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(1) when the individual is subjected to unwanted social inputs and
stimuli, creating annoyance from the presence of persons or things
which prevent the individual from achieving his desired degree of seclu-
sion; or
(2) when the individual is subjected to unwanted social outputs, cre-
ating annoyance from the unauthorized acquisition or disclosure of
private information concerning the individual which results in unde-
sired social interaction.
The first situation of unwanted social inputs and stimuli could be an
actionable "intrusion" under Prosser's analysis because the person's
"solitude or seclusion" is being invaded.'2 The second situation of un-
wanted social outputs is characterized by the unauthorized acquisition
and disclosure of private information. The unauthorized acquisition of
private information could involve an actionable "intrusion" under Pros-
ser's analysis because it involves an invasion into the "private affairs or
concerns" of the person.'2 9 The unauthorized disclosure of private infor-
mation could obviously be an actionable "public disclosure of private
facts" under Prosser's analysis.'30 Thus, Prosser is correct in characteriz-
ing the torts of "intrusion" and "public disclosure of private facts" as
invasions of privacy. However, weaknesses in the other torts-"false
light" and "appropriation"-are revealed by the ensuing discussion.
b. False Light in the Public Eye
A third tort in Prosser's four-pronged privacy analysis is "false light."
Prosser defines the tort of "false light" as "publicity which places the
plaintiff in a false light in the public eye."' 3 ' The tort protects against
publications which falsely portray some attribute of the plaintiff.'32 For
example, a claim of false light might arise if the picture of an honest
person is used without his consent in connection with a magazine article
on the cheating propensities of taxi drivers.'3
The false light need not be defamatory, but it very often is.' There-
128. See, e.g., Galella v. Onassis, 353 F. Supp. 196, 227-31 (S.D.N.Y. 1972) (constant
"haunting" of Jackie Onassis by a photographer), modified, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973);
Rugg v. McCarty, 173 Colo. 170, 476 P.2d 753 (1970) (harrassment from numerous tele-
phone calls); Summit Loans, Inc. v. Pecola, 265 Md. 43, 288 A.2d 114 (1972) (same).
129. See, e.g., Hamberger v. Eastman, 106 N.H. 107, 111-13, 206 A.2d 239, 241 (1964)
(bugging of a married couple's bedroom); Nader v. General Motors Corp., 25 N.Y.2d 560,
565-67, 255 N.E.2d 765, 768-70, 307 N.Y.S.2d 647, 651-53 (1970); LeCrone v. Ohio Bell Tel.
Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 131-37, 201 N.E.2d 533, 536-38 (1963).
130. See, e.g., Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425 U.S.
998 (1976); Tollefson v. Price, 247 Ore. 398, 430 P.2d 990 (1967) (in banc).
131. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 812 (4th ed. 1971).
132. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E, Comment a (1977).
133. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 812-13 (4th ed. 1971) (citing
Peay v. Curtis Pub. Co., 78 F. Supp. 305 (D.D.C. 1948)).
134. Id. at 813.
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fore, Prosser states that like the tort of defamation, the tort of false light
protects reputation. 135 Because the tort is designed to protect reputation,
and, more importantly, because there is no requirement that the false
light relate to private information, 13 the efficacy of using the false light
tort as a protection for privacy is cast in considerable doubt. A helpful
starting point in determining whether the tort of false light involves an
invasion of privacy is to dichotomize the false light tort into false state-
ments of public fact and false statements of private fact.
i. False Public Fact in the Public Eye
One manner in which the plaintiff can be placed in a false light is
through the false publication of a public fact. For example, inclusion of
an unconvicted person's name or photograph in a "rogue's gallery" of
convicted criminals places a false public fact (criminal conviction) in
the public eye.'37 False portrayal of a public fact, however, probably does
not cause an invasion of privacy because the defendant has not inter-
fered with the plaintiff's interest in controlling the disclosure of private
information. The plaintiff could even correct the harm, without reveal-
ing any private information, by publishing the true public fact in rebut-
tal. Consequently, false publication of a public fact probably creates
only potential injury to the plaintiff's reputation and not his privacy.
Because it is the plaintiff's reputation which is potentially injured,
rather than his privacy, relief from false public fact in the public eye
should be based on the theory of common law defamation rather than
tortious invasion of privacy. 3 "
Aside from the lack of injury to privacy, allowing recovery merely on
the basis of a false public fact in the public eye would be objectionable
for another reason. The Minnesota Supreme Court has allowed recovery
for the publication of a false statement only if the statement injures the
plaintiff's reputation. 9 If the false light claim was adopted in Minne-
135. Prosser, supra note 28, at 400.
136. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTs § 652E, Comment a (1977) states in part:
The form of invasion of privacy covered by the [false light] rule stated in this
Section does not depend upon making public any facts concerning the private
life of the individual. On the contrary, it is essential to the rule stated in this
Section that the matter published concerning the plaintiff is not true.
137. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 813 (4th ed. 1971).
138. See Patton v. Royal Indus., Inc., 263 Cal. App. 2d 760, 767, 70 Cal. Rptr. 44, 48
(1968); Gross, supra note 28, at 47-48. The Minnesota Supreme Court will allow recovery
for defamation if the false public fact injures the plaintiff's reputation. See, e.g., Brill v.
Minnesota Mines, Inc., 200 Minn. 454, 274 N.W. 631 (1937) (if false, a published state-
ment that an attorney solicited the representation of minority stockholders for his own
purpose, rather than to assert the minority's rights, was an actionable defamation);
Hrdlicka v. Warner, 144 Minn. 277, 175 N.W. 299 (1919) (a false statement that plaintiff
mail carrier threatened boys on his route is an actionable defamation).
139. See, e.g., Larson v. R.B. Wrigley Co., 183 Minn. 28, 235 N.W. 393 (1931) (state-
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sota as a theory of recovery, the Minnesota Supreme Court, in effect,
would be eliminating the requirement that the statement be defamatory
and substituting instead the requirement that it be "highly offensive to
a reasonable person." 0 The tort of defamation would thereby be en-
gulfed. '
Although several jurisdictions have expressly recognized the tort of
false light,"' the Minnesota court might not recognize that aspect of the
tort which encompasses false public fact in the public eye because that
aspect does not protect privacy and it is inconsistent with prior defama-
tion decisions. If the tort of false public fact in the public eye is adopted
in Minnesota, justification must be based on a person's interest in hav-
ing his public life accurately portrayed and not on his interests in pri-
vacy.
ii. False Private Fact in the Public Eye
A second manner in which the plaintiff can be placed in a false light
is through the false publication of a private fact. For example, false
statements that the plaintiff engages in "profane love" or is a "man
hungry" woman creates a claim for false light."' Conceivably, a false
private fact in the public eye could be both an actionable invasion of
privacy and defamation.
When a defendant falsely publishes a private fact, there are two perti-
nent aspects to his conduct. First, the defendant has published informa-
tion concerning the plaintiff's private life. Second, the defendant has
falsely portrayed this information. If only the first aspect was involved,
ment that the plaintiff was too dirty to be served in a restaurant is not actionable because
the words do not have "substance and body enough to constitute an injury by affecting
the reputation"); Note, Minnesota Defamation Law and the Constitution: First Amend-
ment Limitations on the Common Law Torts of Libel and Slander, 3 Wm. MrrCHELL L.
REv. 81, 83-84 (1977).
However, in Marudas v. Odegard, 215 Minn. 357, 359-61, 10 N.W.2d 233, 235 (1943) the
Minnesota Supreme Court said that publication of a false statement gives rise to a claim
in tort, even though it is not defamatory, if the publication is malicious and calculated to
injure the plaintiff's business. The court apparently was distinguishing injury to personal
reputation from injury to business reputation. Yet it is well-established in Minnesota that
the publication of falsehoods injurious to a person's business reputation are defamatory
per se. See, e.g., Gadach v. Benton County Co-op Ass'n, 236 Minn. 507, 510, 53 N.W.2d
230, 232 (1952); Froslee v. Lund's State Bank, 131 Minn. 435, 155 N.W. 619 (1915). Thus
the implication in Marudas that an action can be predicated on a nondefamatory false-
hood seems to be inconsistent with existing Minnesota law.
140. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652E(a) (1977).
141. Wade, Defamation and the Right of Privacy, 15 VAND. L. REv. 1093, 1095 (1962).
142. See, e.g., Cantrell v. Forest City Pub. Co., 419 U.S. 245, 248 & n.2 (1974) (discuss-
ing Ohio and West Virginia law); Brown v. Capricorn Records, Inc., 136 Ga. App. 818,
818-19, 222 S.E.2d 618, 619 (1975); Froelich v. Werbin, 219 Kan. 461, 463-64, 548 P.2d 482,
484 (1976) (dictum); Reed v. Ponton, 15 Mich. App. 423, 426, 166 N.W.2d 629, 630 (1968).
143. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 813 n.16 (4th ed. 1971).
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the plaintiff's privacy clearly would have been invaded because the
conduct would result in unwanted revelations of private information.
The issue, therefore, is whether the second aspect of falsity alters this
effect of publishing private information.
The essence of the injury to privacy from the disclosure of information
is not that the public adopts an unfavorable or false opinion about the
plaintiff; rather, it is that some aspect of the plaintiff's life, favorable
or unfavorable, has been placed before the public without his consent. 4,
Thus, merely because the private fact is falsely published does not jus-
tify the imposition of liability for invasion of privacy. Liability is justi-
fied only if the false publication of private fact interferes with the plain-
tiff's interest in controlling revelations and private information concern-
ing himself.'
Arguably, such publication does not involve an invasion of privacy
because the plaintiff's control over the true private information remains
intact. Nothing private has escaped; the defendant merely lied. A
stronger argument, however, can be made that the false private fact
does interfere with the plaintiff's privacy. By publishing a private fact,
the defendant places the plaintiff's private life in issue even if the publi-
cation is false. The plaintiff may either acquiesce in or controvert the
false publication. If the plaintiff acquiesces, his privacy is invaded be-
cause the revelation still coerces new and unwanted social outputs with
its attendant social interaction, even though the revelation is false.
Thus, the injury to dignity is compounded because the private life of a
person is exposed to the public and it is falsely portrayed. If, on the other
hand, the plaintiff contests the false publication, he must do so by
disclosing the true private fact. Unlike injury caused by a false state-
ment of public fact, embarrassment from false publication of a private
fact cannot be redressed by more speech such as retraction and correc-
tion. '4 Thus, regardless of whether plaintiff acquiesces in or controverts
the false statement of private fact, the defendant has interfered with the
plaintiff's control over his private life and thereby invaded his privacy.
The tort of false private fact in the public eye, therefore, involves an
invasion of privacy.'47
144. E.g., Themo v. New England Newspaper Pub. Co., 306 Mass. 54, 57, 27 N.E.2d
753, 755 (1940) ("The fundamental difference between a right to privacy and a right to
freedom from defamation is that the former directly concerns one's own peace of mind,
while the latter concerns primarily one's reputation .... "); Bloustein, supra note 28, at
981; Nimmer, The Right to Speak from Times to Time: First Amendment Theory Applied
to Libel and Misapplied to Privacy, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 935, 958-59 (1968).
145. See notes 48-54 supra and accompanying text.
146. E.g., Kapellas v. Kofman, 1 Cal. 3d 20, 35, 459 P.2d 912, 921, 81 Cal. Rptr. 360,
369 (1969); Nimmer, supra note 144, at 961.
147. See, e.g., Linehan v. Linehan, 134 Cal. App. 2d 250, 285 P.2d 326 (1955) (false
statement that plaintiff was not lawfully married to the person with whom she was living);
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The false publication of a private fact might also give rise to an action
for libel or slander. "' To recover for libel or slander in Minnesota, the
statement must be false and defamatory."' The plaintiff must at least
prove that the defendant negligently or intentionally communicated the
statement to a third party and intentionally referred to the plaintiff."
5
0
If first amendment limitations are applicable, the plaintiff must also
prove the defendant negligently or knowingly failed to ascertain the
statement's falsity.'
5'
Although the plaintiff should be entitled to recover only once for a
claim involving the false publication of defamatory private facts, there
is little theoretical objection to computing damages on the basis of in-
jury to reputation together with injury to privacy.' 2 In computing dam-
ages for invasion of privacy, the jury should disregard the falsity of the
statement and assume it is true because the gist of the injury to privacy
is not that the statement is false, but rather that the statement puts the
plaintiff's private life in issue and reveals it to the public. In computing
damages for defamation, the jury should examine the falsity of the
statement and determine its damage to reputation."1
3
c. Appropriation
Prosser's fourth privacy tort, "appropriation," consists of "the appro-
Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 127 P.2d 577 (1942) (false attribu-
tion of desire for sexual relationship); Wade, supra note 141, at 1106-07 & n.84.
148. See, e.g., Ernster v. Eltgroth, 149 Minn. 39, 182 N.W. 709 (1921) (imputation that
an unmarried woman is unchaste); Reitan v. Goebel, 33 Minn. 151, 22 N.W. 291 (1885)
(statement charging an unmarried woman with fornication).
149. See, e.g., Matthis v. Kennedy, 243 Minn. 219, 222-23, 67 N.W.2d 413, 416 (1954);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 558-559 (1977).
150. Olson v. Molland, 181 Minn. 364, 232 N.W. 625 (1930) (defendant must negligently
or intentionally communicate the statement); Kramer v. Perkins, 102 Minn. 455, 456-59,
113 N.W. 1062, 1063-64 (1907) (same); Knox v. Meehan, 64 Minn. 280, 281-82, 66 N.W.
1149, 1149-50 (1896) (defendant must intentionally refer to the plaintiff); Dressel v. Ship-
man, 57 Minn. 23, 58 N.W. 684 (1894) (same). For a detailed discussion of the common
law elements to an action for defamation, see Note, supra note 139, at 83-89.
151. If the plaintiff is a public figure or public official, he must prove the defendant
acted with actual malice, that is, with knowledge of the statement's falsity or reckless
disregard for the truth. See Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts, 388 U.S. 130 (1967) (public figures);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (public officials). If the plaintiff is
neither a public figure nor a public official, he may recover actual damages upon a showing
that the defendant negligently failed to ascertain falsity. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418
U.S. 323 (1974). See generally Note, supra note 139.
152. Damages which can be recovered for a defamation include injury to reputation,
special harm, and mental distress. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 620-623 (1977).
Damages recoverable for an invasion of privacy include injury to privacy, special harm,
and mental distress. Id. § 652H. The plaintiff should not be able to recover twice for the
same special harm and mental distress, but there is no reason why the plaintiff should
not be allowed separate recovery for injury to reputation and injury to privacy.
153. See, e.g., id. § 616.
19781
27
et al.: Tortious Invasion of Privacy: Minnesota as a Model
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1978
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
priation, for the defendant's benefit or advantage, of the plaintiffs
name or likeness."'' 4 A claim for appropriation would arise, for example,
if a person's picture was used without his consent to promote a prod-
uct. 55 Courts frequently afford relief against commercial appropriation
of one's name or likeness.' 5 But because Prosser himself recognizes that
the tort protects a property interest,'57 he is misguided in characterizing
the tort as an invasion of privacy.' 8 The protection of privacy through
principles of property law has long been discredited,' and for good
reasons.
Property has been defined as "the exclusive right of possessing, enjoy-
ing, and disposing, of a thing ... ."I60 It is easy to understand how this
definition could be adapted to protect privacy merely by giving private
information the characteristics of property. Indeed, legal principles of
trespass or copyright might well serve the purpose of protecting privacy
of the home or of letters.
In many situations, however, concepts of property law probably afford
inadequate protection for privacy. The unlawfulness of an interference
with a property right has traditionally involved judicial inquiry into the
extent of economic injury or unjust enrichment.'"' This inquiry would
154. W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804 (4th ed. 1971).
155. Id. at 805.
156. See, e.g., Uhlaender v. Henricksen, 316 F. Supp. 1277, 1282-83 (D. Minn. 1970);
Kimbrough v. Coca-Cola/USA, 521 S.W.2d 719 (Tex. Ct. App. 1975). See generally Gor-
don, Right of Property in Name, Likeness, Personality and History, 55 Nw. L. REV. 553
(1960); Nimmer, The Right of Publicity, 19 LAW & CONTEMP. PROB. 203 (1954).
Also, several states have statutes prohibiting the appropriation of another's name or
likeness. See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. §§ 540.08-10 (West 1972); N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW § 51
(McKinney 1976); VA. CODE § 8-650 (1957).
157. Prosser, supra note 28, at 406.
158. See Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 708 (D.C. Cir.) (plaintiff's "right to keep his
files from prying eyes" distinguished from "whether the information taken from those files
falls under the protection of the law of property"), cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969).
Decisions involving appropriation "typically involve arm's-length transactions or the ap-
propriation of commercial values, and are wholly devoid of privacy considerations." A.
MILLER, supra note 14, at 213.
159. As early as 1890, Samuel Warren and Louis Brandeis stated:
[Wihere the value of the production is found not in the right to take the profits
arising from publication, but in the peace of mind or the relief afforded by the
ability to prevent any publication at all, it is difficult to regard the right as one
of property, in the common acceptation of that term.
Warren & Brandeis, supra note 28, at 200-01.
Contemporary legal scholars have also discussed the inability of property concepts to
adequately protect privacy. See, e.g., A. MILE, supra note 14, at 211-16 (difficult policy
issues of privacy should not be solved by contorting property and misappropriation theo-
ries, which were originally developed to serve radically different purposes).
160. Banning v. Sibley, 3 Minn. (Gil.) 282, 298 (1859).
161. See, e.g., Baillon v. Carl Bolander & Sons, __ Minn. 235 N.W.2d 613,
614-15 (1975) (damages for trespass to property measured by diminution in value); Alevi-
zos v. Metropolitan Airports Comm'n, 298 Minn. 471, 487, 216 N.W.2d 651, 662 (1974)
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be absurd when the interests to be protected are human dignity and
inviolability of personality.' Thus, to prevent any confusion between
economic and dignitary interests, principles of property law should be
avoided in formulating a tort for invasion of privacy.' 3
This conclusion finds support in a 1970 decision by the Minnesota
Federal District Court. In Uhlaender v. Henricksen,'4 the defendants
manufactured and sold a table baseball game which used the names and
statistics of professional baseball players. Several of the players brought
an action seeking an injunction against the unauthorized use of their
names. The court granted the injunction, stating that misappropriation
of a name, likeness, or personality can give rise to a cause of action
which is not dependent upon an invasion of privacy in the technical
sense.' 5 The court found that a celebrity has a legitimate proprietary
interest in his public personality, and rejected as irrelvant the defen-
dants' argument that the prevalence of the names and statistical infor-
mation in the public domain precluded an invasion of privacy.16"
The Uhlaender decision reveals the anomaly which results when a
celebrity's right to control his name or likeness is characterized as a
right. of privacy: as the celebrity's name becomes less private, more
popular, and commercially valuable, his interest in controlling its unau-
thorized use deserves greater protection. Consequently, the tort of ap-
propriation allows the greatest recovery when the plaintiff's name or
likeness is the least private. Moreover, the distinction between privacy
and property is revealed by those decisions which hold that a cause of
action for invasion of privacy is personal and does not survive after
death,' whereas an action for appropriation survives in favor of the
(inverse condemnation requires a substantial invasion of property rights with a definite
and measurable diminution of the market value of the property).
162. The right of privacy is designed to protect personal feelings and sensibilities rather
than business or pecuniary interests. See Copley v. Northwestern Mut. Life Ins. Co., 295
F. Supp. 93, 95-96 (S.D.W. Va. 1968) (disclosure of private facts and statistics concerning
business is not an actionable invasion of privacy); Maysville Transit Co. v. Ort, 296 Ky.
524, 525-26, 177 S.W.2d 369, 370 (1944) (violation of government official's statutory duty
not to reveal tax information of a business is not an invasion of privacy). See also More-
land, The Right of Privacy To-day, 19 Ky. L.J. 101, 113 (1931) (right of privacy should
be recognized as an independent tort protecting inviolate personality; legal fictions used
in the past should be discarded).
163. See Davis, supra note 19, at 11-12. The approach of equating privacy with property
has been rejected by those courts which hold that a corporation has no right of privacy.
See Oasis Nite Club, Inc. v. Diebold, Inc., 261 F. Supp. 173, 175 (D. Md. 1966); Dauer &
Fittipaldi, Inc. v. Twenty First Century Communications, Inc., 43 App. Div. 2d 178, 180,
349 N.Y.S.2d 736, 738 (1973).
164. 316 F. Supp. 1277 (D. Minn. 1970).
165. Id. at 1281.
166. Id. at 1282-83.
167. See, e.g., James v. Screen Gems, Inc., 174 Cal. App. 2d 650, 344 P.2d 799 (1959)
(widow not allowed to recover for broadcast concerning her deceased husband). See also
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decedent's estate. 68
Why, then, have some courts equated the appropriation of a person's
name or picture with an invasion of privacy? One probable reason is that
anonymity is an aspect of privacy.' Anonymity will be lost if embar-
rassing facts are associated with a particular person. For example, de-
picting a child in a published photograph as mentally retarded would
be an offensive invasion of privacy only if his face is visible or there are
other means of identifying him. 70 In this situation, the appropriation of
the person's name or likeness is merely a means of identifying him with
private information. If the name or likeness is not associated with pri-
vate information, there is no invasion of privacy."'
The interest in anonymity should be protected, but there is no reason
to adopt an overly broad tort such as appropriation. Instead, loss of
Bradley v. Cowles Magazines, Inc., 26 Ill. App. 2d 331, 168 N.E.2d 64 (1960) (mother's
privacy not invaded by a publication concerning her son's murder).
168. A leading case on this point is Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836
(S.D.N.Y. 1975), in which the primary issue was who had the ownership of the commercial
rights to use the names and likenesses of Laurel and Hardy, two deceased comedians.
Applying New York law, the court held that the comedians' "right of publicity" was a
property right which did not terminate upon their deaths, but rather was descendible. The
court said:
Since the theoretical basis for the classic right of privacy, and of the statutory
right in New York, is to prevent injury to feelings, death is a logical conclusion
to any such claim. In addition, based upon the same theoretical foundation,
such a right of privacy is not assignable during life. When determining the scope
of the right of publicity, however, one must take into account the purely com-
mercial nature of the protected right. Courts and commentators have done just
that in recognizing the right of publicity as assignable. There appears to be no
logical reason to terminate this right upon death of the person protected. It is
for this reason, presumably, that this publicity right has been deemed a
"property right."
Id. at 844; accord, Lugosi v. Universal Pictures Co., 172 U.S.P.Q. (BNA) 541, 551-53
(1972). See also Gordon, supra note 156, at 594-605; Green, The Right of Privacy, 27 ILL.
L. REv. 237, 247-48 (1932).
169. E.g., THE SOCIOLOGY OF GEORG SiMMEL 402-08 (K. Wolff ed. 1950) (phenomenon of
the "stranger"); A. WESTIN, supra note 1, at 31-32.
170. See Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Co., 351 Mass. 53, 57-58, 217 N.E.2d 736, 739-40
(1966). In Lambert v. Dow Chem. Co., 215 So. 2d 673 (La. App. 1968) an employee brought
an action for invasion of privacy after a picture of a "ghastly" wound on his thigh was
used by his employer in connection with a safety program. A Louisiana trial court found
that the use of the picture was not actionable because it was used in good faith and did
not reveal any part of the plaintiff's body except for the wound. The Louisiana appellate
court reversed, however, holding the use of the photograph was unreasonable because the
plaintiff was identified from use of his name in connection with the photograph.
171. See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 230-31, 253 P.2d 441, 444-45
(1953) (photograph of a couple at a public market place); Thayer v. Worcester Post Co.,
284 Mass. 160, 163-64, 187 N.E. 292, 293-94 (1933) (photograph of plaintiff taken at an
airport). See also Daily Times Democrat v. Graham, 276 Ala. 380, 162 So. 2d 474 (1964)
(recovery allowed when a photograph taken at a county fair shows plaintiff with her dress
blown up by air jets in a fun house).
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anonymity can be analyzed under other aspects of Prosser's four-tort
approach. If the person's name or likeness was associated with true
private facts, an action for redress could proceed under the tort of public
disclosure of private facts."' If the person's name or likeness was asso-
ciated with false private facts, an action for redress could be analyzed
under the theory of false private fact in the public eye.
7 3
All of these considerations result in two conclusions. First, if the pub-
licity to a person's name or likeness merely causes the usurpation of
commercial value, the name or likeness should be viewed as property
and any liability for its appropriation should be based on principles of
property law. Some courts refer to this property right as the "right of
publicity."'7 4 Second, if the publicity to a person's name or likeness
results in the loss of anonymity and an unwanted association with pri-
vate information, whether true or not, any liability for the publication
should be based on an invasion of privacy.
2. A Proposed Definition of Tortious Invasion of Privacy
An examination of Prosser's approach has revealed several weak-
nesses. It must be borne in mind that his approach is based upon a
categorization of early cases which spoke of privacy' 5 but which were
often decided on theories of breach of trust, breach of contract, and
interference with a property interest.'8 If, as has been suggested, the
early cases on privacy represent little advancement in the law"' and
create confusion analogous to a "haystack in a hurricane,"'7 then Pros-
ser's reliance on such cases represents doubtful improvement.
Prosser can also be criticized for his failure to identify the true nature
of privacy interests.' 9 He states that proprietary interests are protected
by the tort of appropriation, 4 mental interests are protected by the tort
of intrusion,'8 ' and reputation is protected by the torts of false light'8
and publicity given to private facts.'1 As a general proposition, then,
172. See notes 126, 130 supra and accompanying text.
173. See notes 131-36, 143-53 supra and accompanying text.
174. See, e.g., Haelan Labs., Inc. v. Topps, 202 F.2d 866, 868 (2d Cir.), cert. denied,
346 U.S. 816 (1953); Price v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 400 F. Supp. 836, 843-47 (S.D.N.Y.
1975). See generally Nimmer, supra note 156, at 203.
175. See W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 804 (4th ed. 1971).
176. See notes 108-10 supra and accompanying text.
177. See note 111 supra and accompanying text.
178. Ettore v. Philco Television Broadcasting Corp., 229 F.2d 481, 485 (3d Cir.), cert.
denied, 351 U.S. 926 (1956).
179. E.g., Bloustein, supra note 28, at 1004-05; Gross, supra note 28, at 46-51; Note,
supra note 10, at 540-41.
180. Prosser, supra note 28, at 406.
181. Id. at 392.
182. Id. at 400.
183. Id. at 398.
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Prosser's approach is overinclusive, protecting interests other than pri-
vacy.
If Minnesota recognizes a common law right of privacy, however, the
experience of other jurisdictions and the scholarship of Prosser should
not be totally overlooked in defining the elements of tortious invasion
of privacy. What is first necessary, therefore, is to reassemble those
elements of Prosser's categories which define the potentially actionable
means of invading privacy.' Gaps in the tort will remain, however, and
therefore it also is necessary to define the protected zone of privacy"8 5
and determine whether liability should be predicated upon strict liabil-
ity, negligence, or intent.8 6
a. The Potentially Actionable Means of Invading Privacy-The
Reassembly of Prosser's Approach
An examination of Prosser's four-prong privacy approach is beneficial
because it reveals the types of conduct upon which courts have based
recovery. Generally speaking, Prosser has not overlooked any of the
actionable means of invading privacy. His approach, however, is overin-
clusive because it also protects interests other than privacy. What is
needed in defining the potentially actionable means of invading privacy,
therefore, is the reassembly of those aspects which are consistent with
the broader sociopsychological concept of privacy.
In this regard, an analysis of the strengths and weaknesses of Prosser's
approach reveals that only certain aspects of his four-tort complex
should be used as a basis for defining the potentially actionable means
of invading privacy. The two torts which make the greatest contribution
to the formulation of a common law right of privacy are "intrusion" and
"public disclosure of private facts." Both protect the plaintiff's control
over how and when he will present himself to society, and therefore both
achieve the goal of protecting privacy. 7 Second, the elements in the tort
of "false light" bear little relevance to the protection of privacy. 8 Only
in those limited instances of false private fact in the public eye should
the publication be recognized as an invasion of privacy. 9 Third, the
elements in the tort of "appropriation" provide little assistance in defin-
ing a tort which focuses on the protection of privacy. The tort of appro-
priation essentially protects the plaintiff's property interest in his name
or likeness against commercial exploitation. Although privacy may be
involved if publicity to plaintiff's identity results in the unwanted loss
184. See notes 187-90 infra and accompanying text.
185. See notes 191-200 infra and accompanying text.
186. See notes 201-45 infra and accompanying text.
187. See notes 125-30 supra and accompanying text.
188. See notes 131-42 supra and accompanying text.
189. See notes 143-53 supra and accompanying text.
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of anonymity, this situation seems to be adequately encompassed by
the torts of false private fact in the public eye and public disclosure of
private facts.'10 Therefore, the tort of appropriation probably should not
be used in formulating a common law right of privacy.
Consequently, three aspects of Prosser's analysis bear relevance to the
determination of the means of invading privacy which should be poten-
tially actionable at common law. First, intrusion upon the plaintiff's
solitude or seclusion should be a potentially actionable invasion of pri-
vacy. Second, the acquisition or disclosure of private facts should be a
potentially actionable invasion of privacy. Finally, false publication of
a private fact should be a potentially actionable invasion of privacy.
Although these adequately define the potentially actionable means of
invading into a person's zone of privacy, they do not provide insight on
defining the perimeters of the legally protected zone of privacy or the
standard of fault with which the invading means must be accomplished.
b. The Zone of Privacy and its Perimeter of Legal Protection
Privacy is a matter of degree; some expectations of privacy are greater
than others. An actionable interference with privacy requires that pri-
vacy expectations be within the legally protected zone of privacy. The
zone of privacy to which the common law will afford protection appears
limited by at least two requirements. One is that the invasion must be
"highly offensive.""' Thus, supersensitivity is probably not protec-
ted.'92 A second, more troublesome, requirement is that the plaintiff's
expectation of privacy must be objectively reasonable to society as
well as subjectively actual to the plaintiff.' 3 The requirement of rea-
sonableness, in fact, is often stated in connection with the requirement
of offensiveness. The Minnesota court has said: "[The invasion] must
lift the curtain of privacy on a subject matter that a reasonable man of
190. See notes 154-74 supra and accompanying text.
191. E.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 808, 811 (4th ed. 1971);
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 652B, 652D(a) (1977).
192. E.g., Hendry v. Conner, 303 Minn. 317, 319 n.1, 226 N.W.2d 921, 923 n.1 (1975)
(per curiam); Meetze v. Associated Press, 230 S.C. 330, 337-38, 95 S.E.2d 606, 610 (1956).
193. E.g., W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 117, at 808, 811 (4th ed. 1971)
(invasion must be objectionable to a "reasonable man"); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS
§ 652D, Comment c (1977). In the determination of whether a person has a fourth amend-
ment right of privacy against government searches and seizures, the Minnesota Supreme
Court has stated:
[Tihere is a twofold requirement, first that a person have exhibited an actual
(subjective) expectation of privacy and, second, that the expectation be one that
society is prepared to recognize as "reasonable."
State v. Bryant, 287 Minn. 205, 210, 177 N.W.2d 800, 803 (1970) (quoting Katz v. United
States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring)).
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ordinary sensibilities would find offensive and objectionable ... ."9
The reasonableness requirement is disturbing because privacy is often
sought to protect abnormal and unreasonable aspects of a person's char-
acter. Strictly applied, therefore, the reasonableness requirement would
deny legal protection to the very conduct or beliefs which, without the
shield of privacy, cannot survive society's disapproval and pressure to-
wards normality. Consequently, the law might fail when it is needed the
most.
The reasonableness requirement does, however, have the advantage
of preventing recovery when the invasion is trivial or claimed merely on
the basis of subjective expectations of privacy. The tort obviously would
be unworkable if the plaintiff was allowed to recover, for example, on
the grounds that the defendant stood too close to the plaintiff in the
elevator,'95 took a photograph of the plaintiff in a public place, ", or
disclosed a fact appearing on public record. 19
In view of both the disadvantage and advantage of a reasonableness
requirement, perhaps the best compromise can be struck by applying a
standard of "community mores" based on analogy to standards used in
determining obscene or defamatory matter. Proscribable obscenity is
determined by community standards.'99 Like protection to privacy, the
proscription of obscenity has the purpose of preventing offensive con-
duct detrimental to the individual and society. 99 It is only logical that
the nature and extent of this offensiveness be measured by the stan-
dards of the local community in which the conduct occurs. The common
law of defamation tests the defamatory nature of a statement by the
mores of any substantial and respectable group in which the plaintiff is
a member, even if somewhat abnormal, rather than the mores of society
as a whole.99 The application of the "community mores" standard
194. Hendry v. Conner, 303 Minn. 317, 319 n.1, 226 N.W.2d 921, 923 n.1 (1975) (per
curiam) (emphasis added).
195. Cf., e.g., Horstman v. Newman, 291 S.W.2d 567, 568 (Ky. Ct. App. 1956) (per
curiam) (landlord's business visit to tenant's house on a Sunday not an actionable inva-
sion of privacy); Forster v. Manchester, 410 Pa. 192, 195-98, 189 A.2d 147, 149-50 (1963)
(trailing plaintiff in a public area is not an actionable invasion of privacy).
196. See, e.g., Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F. Supp. 957 (D. Minn.
1948); Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 230, 253 P.2d 441, 444-45 (1953) (in bank).
197. See, e.g., Hubbard v. Journal Pub. Co., 69 N.M. 473, 368 P.2d 147 (1962); Rome
Sentinel Co. v. Boustedt, 43 Misc. 2d 598, 252 N.Y.S.2d 10 (Sup. Ct. 1964).
198. See note 300 infra.
199. See, e.g., Roth v. United States; 354 U.S. 476, 484-85 (1957) (first amendment does
not protect obscenity); Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942)
("[Obscene utterances] are of such slight social value as a step to truth that any benefit
that may be derived from them is clearly outweighed by the social interest in order and
morality.").
200. See, e.g., Brauer v. Globe Newspaper Co., 351 Mass. 53, 55, 217 N.E.2d 736, 738
(1966); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 665-66, 134 S.W. 1076, 1080-81 (1910);
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would, for example, determine the actionability of an invasion of pri-
vacy caused by "junk phone calls" from city businesses to a rural farmer
on the basis of the expectation of privacy held by farmers in that rural
area, not those held by city dwellers.
Once the protected zone of privacy is defined and the potentially
actionable means of invading it are ascertained, a court should also
consider the defendant's fault in accomplishing the particular means of
invasion into the protected zone of privacy. This requires the court to
determine whether it will impose strict liability or condition liability
upon a showing of fault.
c. The Culpability of Defendant's Conduct-The Standard of Fault for
Imposition of Liability
Assuming the defendant has accomplished one of the means of invad-
ing privacy and that he has penetrated the legally protected zone of the
plaintiff's privacy, the court must still determine whether it will impose
strict liability or condition liability upon proof that the invading act was
a result of some fault, such as negligence or intent. This determination
will be a function of balancing the conflicting interests of the plaintiff,
the defendant, and the public.20 '
This determination is complicated further because there are at least
two ways in which a person can be at fault in the course of invading
another's privacy.02 One aspect concerns the defendant's fault in failing
to foresee injury to privacy. There would be no fault in this aspect, for
example, if the defendant intended to publish a fact but had no reason
to know it was a private fact or that it would invade the plaintiff's
privacy. A second aspect of the invading conduct in which the defendant
might be at fault is the physical act itself. There would be no fault in
this aspect, for example, if the plaintiff gave the defendant a document
known to contain highly private information and the defendant acci-
dently published the document. Discussed below are the factors which
should be considered in the selection of the fault standard, if any, for
each of the two aspects of the defendant's invading conduct.
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 559, Comment e (1977).
201. See W. PRossER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF TORTS § 3 (4th ed. 1971). See generally
R. POUND, THE TASK OF LAW (1944).
202. In two recent cases concerning the construction of insurance policies, the Minne-
sota Supreme Court has recognized the distinction between fault with regard to the physi-
cal act and fault with regard to the injury. In Caspersen v. Webber, 298 Minn. 93, 97-99,
213 N.W.2d 327, 330 (1973) the court held that an exclusion in a liability policy for
"intentional" injuries was not applicable, even though the defendant intentionally pushed
the plaintiff, because her resulting fall and injury were not intended by the defendant.
This rule was followed subsequently in Continental W. Ins. Co. v. Toal, - Minn.
-, 244 N.W.2d 121, 124-25 (1976).
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i. Foreseeability of the Injury to Privacy
If the defendant failed to foresee that his conduct would cause an
invasion of privacy, liability probably will not be imposed unless this
failure was at least negligent. The Minnesota court and the courts of
other jurisdictions have indicated that a plaintiff's privacy will not re-
ceive legal protection unless the expectation of privacy is objectively
reasonable. 03 Moreover, objective reasonableness might be tested by
community mores. 0 The requirement that expectations of privacy be
objectively reasonable can be transposed into a requirement that the
expectation of privacy be foreseeable to a reasonable person. Thus if the
defendant, acting as a reasonable person, had no reason to foresee that
his act would cause an invasion of privacy, the plaintiff's expectation
of privacy cannot be said to be objectively reasonable and recovery
should be denied. Several courts have taken this position, stating that
recovery will be denied when the injury to privacy is not reasonably
foreseeable.10
5
Although it is relatively clear that the Minnesota court will require
reasonable foreseeability of injury to privacy, it is not as clear whether
it will require an even higher standard of fault: actual foreseeability of
the injury to privacy. If the defendant actually foresees the injury to
privacy, he actually believes that his conduct will cause an invasion of
privacy. In effect, this borders on common law malice because the de-
fendant has the "sinister intent" to injure the plaintiff's privacy.0 , It
is generally agreed by most courts, however, that an invasion of privacy
need not be malicious. 07 If Minnesota follows these jurisdictions, there-
203. See notes 193-94 supra and accompanying text.
204. See notes 195-200 supra and accompanying text.
205. See, e.g., Samuel v. Curtis Pub. Co., 122 F. Supp. 327, 329 (N.D. Cal. 1954); Gill
v. Hearst Pub. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 229, 253 P.2d 441, 444 (1953) (in bank); Bitsie v.
Walston, 85 N.M. 655, 659, 515 P.2d 659, 663 (Ct. App.), cert. denied, 85 N.M. 639, 515
P.2d 643 (1973).
206. Warren & Brandeis, supra note 28, at 218-19; see State v. Jankowitz, 175 Minn.
409, 410, 221 N.W. 533, 533 (1928) ("[A] person is deemed malicious when he does an
act intending to injure another."); Sorenson v. Chevrolet Motor Co., 171 Minn. 260, 264,
214 N.W. 754, 755 (1927) (malice defined as "the intentional doing of a wrongful act ... ,
malice in the sense of ill-will or spite not being essential") (quoting Carnes v. St. Paul
Union Stockyards Co., 164 Minn. 457, 462, 205 N.W. 630, 631-32 (1925)); Lammers v.
Mason, 123 Minn. 204, 205-06, 143 N.W. 359, 360 (1913) ("Whatever is done willfully and
purposely, if it be at the same time wrong and unlawful, and that known to the party, is
in legal contemplation malicious.").
207. See. e.g., Fairfield v. American Photocopy Equip. Co., 138 Cal. App. 2d 82, 87,
291 P.2d 194, 197 (1955), aff'd second appeal on other grounds, 158 Cal. App. 2d 53, 322
P.2d 93 (1958); Cason v. Baskin, 155 Fla. 198, 205, 20 So. 2d 243, 246 (1945) (en banc),
rev'd second appeal on other grounds en banc, 159 Fla. 31, 30 So. 2d 635 (1947); Lucas v.
Ludwig, 313 So. 2d 12, 14 (La. Ct. App. 1975), cert. denied, __ La. - , 318 So. 2d 42
(1975); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 28, at 218-19.
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fore, actual foreseeability of the injury to privacy would probably not
be required.
ii. Fault Concerning the Physical Act
The second aspect of the defendant's conduct in which he might be
at fault is the manner in which he physically accomplishes the means
of invading privacy. Thus even if a defendant realizes that a certain act
will cause an invasion of privacy, he would be without fault in this
aspect of his conduct if he exercises reasonable care to prevent the act.
The court could impose strict liability, or it could require that the act
be negligently or intentionally accomplished.
There is little justification for adopting a standard of strict liability.
Perhaps the only argument in favor of imposing strict liability can be
made by analogy to nuisance law. Intrusive noises which disrupt the
peace and quiet of a neighborhood might constitute a nuisance as well
as an invasion of privacy.2 0' Because neither intent nor negligence is
required to impose liability for a nuisance, '20 this common law tort lends
some support to the adoption of a standard which would impose strict
liability for invasion of privacy.
The common law has also imposed strict liability on those industries
where injuries are inevitable and therefore made a cost of doing business
in an attempt to distribute losses among consumers and reduce losses
through competitive incentives.2 1 0 In Minnesota this rationale for strict
208. See, e.g., Robinson v. Westman, 224 Minn. 105, 112, 29 N.W.2d 1, 3 (1947); Rouko-
vina v. Island Farm Creamery Co., 160 Minn. 335, 200 N.W. 350 (1924); Brede v. Minne-
sota Crushed Stone Co., 143 Minn. 374, 173 N.W. 805 (1919), aff'd second appeal, 146
Minn. 406, 178 N.W. 820 (1920).
209. See, e.g., Hill v. Stokely-Van Camp, Inc., 260 Minn. 315, 319, 109 N.W.2d 749,
752 (1961); H. Christiansen & Sons v. City of Duluth, 225 Minn. 475, 482-83, 31 N.W.2d
270, 275-76 (1948) (dictum); Mokovich v. Independent School Dist. No. 22, 177 Minn. 446,
449, 225 N.W. 292, 293 (1929) (dictum). In State v. Lloyd A. Fry Roofing Co., - Minn.
__ 246 N.W.2d 692 (1976) the defendant attempted to defend against a criminal action
for nuisance on the grounds that the nuisance was not created intentionally or negligently.
The court rejected the argument because "[wihile intent and the failure to act reasonably
are not essential elements of common-law nuisance violations, they are even less relevant
to nuisances which are codified in statutes or ordinances." Id. at -, 246 N.W.2d at 695.
Although the reference to common law nuisance is dictum, the court seems to have taken
a strong position that liability for such nuisances can be imposed without a showing of
fault.
One situation which should be distinguished is where a negligent act also constitutes a
nuisance. In this situation the Minnesota court will apply common law principles of
negligence rather than nuisance. See Scott v. Village of Olivia, 260 Minn. 346, 352, 110
N.W.2d 21, 26 (1961); Randall v. Village of Excelsior, 258 Minn. 81, 86, 103 N.W.2d 131,
135 (1960).
210. See Feezer, Capacity to Bear Loss as a Factor in the Decision of Certain Types of
Tort Cases (pts. 1-2), 78 U. PA. L. REV. 805 (1930), 79 U. PA. L. REV. 742 (1931); Ognall,
Some Facets of Strict Tortious Liability in the United States and Their Implications, 33
NOTRE DAME LAW. 239, 269-71 (1958); Prosser, The Fall of the Citadel (Strict Liability to
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liability primarily has been confined to products liability.'" Application
of this rationale to mental injuries resulting from invasion of privacy
would represent an unexpected extension of the doctrine.
The common law similarly imposes strict liability for injuries caused
by abnormally dangerous activities. In Cahill v. Eastman,"' the Minne-
sota equivalent of Rylands v. Fletcher,"3 the Minnesota Supreme Court
imposed liability without fault for damages sustained by an adjoining
landowner when river water broke through defendant's underground
tunnels. The rationale of Cahill, of Minnesota cases following it," and
of Minnesota cases relating to damage caused by animals," 5 is that strict
liability is imposed for damage caused by an activity which is known to
have a natural tendency to cause harm. In other words, strict liability
is imposed if the activity is abnormally dangerous." '
It is possible for a business to specialize in an activity which is abnor-
mally dangerous to privacy. Private detective and debt collection agen-
cies have frequently been the subjects of liability for invasion of pri-
vacy." ' As a practical matter, however, most enterprises are probably
the Consumer), 50 MINN. L. REv. 791, 800 (1966). But see Wights v. Staff Jennings, Inc.,
241 Ore. 301, 307-10, 405 P.2d 624, 627-29 (1965) (rejecting rationale of enterprise liabil-
ity).
211. See, e.g., Farr v. Armstrong Rubber Co., 288 Minn. 83, 88-94, 179 N.W.2d 64, 68-
71 (1970); McCormack v. Hankscraft Co., 278 Minn. 322, 337-40, 154 N.W.2d 488, 499-
501 (1967), aff'd second appeal on other grounds per curiam, 281 Minn. 571, 161 N.W.2d
523 (1968).
212. 18 Minn. 324 (Gil. 292) (1871).
213. L.R. 3 E. & I. App. 330 (1868).
214. See Gould v. Winona Gas Co., 100 Minn. 258, 259-64, 111 N.W. 254, 254-56 (1907)
(natural gas lines do not have inherent tendency to cause damage), aff'd second appeal
per curiam sub nom., Sherman v. Winona Gas Co., 103 Minn. 518, 114 N.W. 654 (1908);
Wiltse v. City of Red Wing, 99 Minn. 255, 109 N.W. 114 (1906) (municipality's storage of
800,000 gallons of water has the natural tendency to cause harm); Berger v. Minneapolis
Gaslight Co., 60 Minn. 296, 300-01, 62 N.W. 336, 337-38 (1895) (storage of 250,000 gallons
of petroleum has natural tendency to cause harm if it escapes); Hannem v. Pence, 40
Minn. 127, 129-31, 41 N.W. 657, 658-59 (1889) (slope of roof having natural tendency to
throw snow on street and cause damage).
215. See, e.g., Matson v. Kivimaki, 294 Minn. 140, 148-50, 200 N.W.2d 164, 169 (1972)
(alternative holding) (strict liability imposed for harm caused by dog known to be
"vicious"); Clark v. Brings, 284 Minn. 73, 75, 169 N.W.2d 407, 409 (1969) (strict liability
imposed for harm caused by domesticated animal if it is proven to be "abnormal and
dangerous"; strict liability imposed for harm caused by a wild animal because its owner
is "conclusively presumed to know of the danger").
216. See Ferguson v. Northern States Power, - Minn. 239 N.W.2d 190,
193-94 (1976) (dictum); Quigley v. Village of Hibbing, 268 Minn. 541, 542-43, 129 N.W.2d
765, 767 (1964) (dictum). See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 519-520 (1977)
(imposition of liability for abnormally dangerous activity; definition of "abnormally dan-
gerous").
217. See, e.g., Pinkerton Nat'l Detective Agency, Inc. v. Stevens, 108 Ga. App. 159, 132
S.E.2d 119 (1963) (detective agency); Boudreaux v. Allstate Fin. Corp., 217 So. 2d 439
(La. Ct. App. 1968) (debt collection agency); Souder v. Pendleton Detectives, Inc., 88 So.
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not abnormally dangerous to privacy, and therefore a general rule of
strict liability would be unjustified. In addition, this rationale for strict
liability has apparently never been invoked when the harm to plaintiff
is purely mental.
Adoption of a negligence standard finds greater support in existing
law than the imposition of strict liability. Minnesota law allows recovery
for negligent infliction of mental distress, even though it is not caused
by physical impact, if the distress is severe enough to cause physical
symptoms."'2 The mental harm caused by infliction of mental distress
obviously is similar to that suffered from an invasion of privacy. The
Minnesota court's recognition of a right to recover for negligent inflic-
tion of severe mental distress therefore is persuasive of adopting a negli-
gence standard for actionable invasion of privacy.
Analogy to defamation law also supports the adoption of at least a
negligence standard. The interest protected by defamation law, of
course, differs from the interest protected by privacy law because defa-
mation law recognizes reputational injury from a false viewing of the
2d 716 (La. Ct. App. 1956) (detective agency); Biederman's of Springfield, Inc. v. Wright,
322 S.W.2d 892 (Mo. 1959) (debt collection agency).
218. Early Minnesota cases have spoken of a right to recover for mental distress when
it is proximately caused by a "legal wrong." See Sanderson v. Northern Pac. Ry., 88 Minn.
162, 166-67, 92 N.W. 542, 543-44 (1902); Larson v. Chase, 47 Minn. 307, 310-12, 50 N.W.
238, 239-40 (1891). This statement begs the question, however, of whether negligent inflic-
tion of mental distress is a legal wrong.
In the classic case of Purcell v. St. Paul City Ry., 48 Minn. 134, 50 N.W. 1034 (1892),
however, the Minnesota Supreme Court made it clear that a person can recover for the
negligent infliction of mental distress. In that case the plaintiff suffered severe emotional
distress after the cable car in which she was riding came close to colliding with another
cable car. The near-collision was caused by the negligence of defendant transit company.
The court affirmed an order which overruled a general demurrer to the complaint because
the plaintiff was entitled to recover for the severe illness if proximately caused by the
negligence.
This rule was clarified in Okrina v. Midwestern Corp., 282 Minn. 400, 165 N.W.2d 259
(1969). In that case the plaintiff suffered severe mental distress after witnessing the
collapse of a wall in a store where she was shopping. As a result of the mental distress,
she was hospitalized and suffered pain in her head, back, and leg. The plaintiff brought
an action against the construction company which allegedly was negligent in removing
lateral supports for the wall. The court held that plaintiff could recover for her injuries.
Relying on the rule in Purcell, the court stated:
We noted [in Purcell] that a cause of action would not exist for fright or mental
distress alone, but where fright results in a physical injury the plaintiff does
have a cause of action.
. . . Here, there was a physical injury sustained as a result of . . .
[plaintiff's] fear and not merely mental anguish unaccompanied by symptoms
of physical suffering . . ..
Id. at 404, 165 N.W. at 262.
Apparently, therefore, the rule is that a person can recover for negligent infliction of
mental distress if the mental distress is accompanied by physical manifestations such as
pain, vomiting, convulsions, or other similar symptoms.
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plaintiff's personality, whereas privacy law should recognize dignitary
injury from any viewing at all of the plaintiff's private life. 19 But there
are similarities because both injuries can be caused by means of publica-
tion " and both injuries involve mental distress.
221
The Minnesota common law does not impose liability for defamation
unless the defendant at least negligently communicated the statement
to a third party22 and intentionally referred to the plaintiff.223 If these
principles are carried into privacy law, a plaintiff could not recover for
the disclosure of private information unless the defendant at least negli-
gently disclosed it and intentionally identified the plaintiff as the sub-
ject of the information. 24
A requirement that the defendant intentionally accomplish the physi-
cal act finds support in the Restatement (Second) of Torts. It takes the
position that an intrusion into the plaintiff's solitude or seclusion is not
actionable unless it is intentional.ns This position has been reiterated
by several courts, although the question of intent was never at issue.229
Apparently only one court has expressly stated that negligent intrusions
are not actionable; 27 on the other hand, at least one court has rejected
this position and held that even a negligent intrusion is actionable.2
219. See note 144 supra and accompanying text.
220. Compare, e.g., Mahnke v. Northwest Pubs., Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 160 N.W.2d 1
(1968) (defamation appearing in a newspaper) and Rose v. Koch, 278 Minn. 235, 154
N.W.2d 409 (1967) (defamation appearing in a circular) with, e.g., Tollefson v. Price, 247
Ore. 398, 430 P.2d 990 (1967) (in banc) (private debt revealed in a newspaper advertise-
ment). See generally Wade, supra note 141.
221. Compare, e.g., Thorson v. Albert Lea Pub. Co., 190 Minn. 200, 204, 251 N.W. 177,
179 (1933) (mental distress is an element of damages for libel) with, e.g., Hinish v. Meier
& Frank Co., 166 Ore. 482, 506, 113 P.2d 438, 447-49 (1941) (mental distress is an element
of damages for invasion of privacy) and RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652H(b) (1977)
(same).
222. E.g., Olson v. Molland, 181 Minn. 364, 232 N.W. 625 (1930). See also RESTATEMENT
(SECOND) OF TORTS § 577 (1977) (requiring negligence or intent).
223. See Clare v. Farrell, 70 F. Supp. 276 (D. Minn. 1947) (applying Minnesota law);
Knox v. Meehan, 64 Minn. 280, 281-82, 66 N.W. 1149, 1149-50 (1896); Dressel v. Shipman,
57 Minn. 23, 58 N.W. 684 (1894).
224. Several courts have expressly recognized the analogy between fault in the context
of defamation and fault in the context of publicity given to private information. See, e.g.,
Kerby v. Hal Roach Studios, Inc., 53 Cal. App. 2d 207, 213, 127 P.2d 577, 581 (1942);
Blount v. TD Pub. Corp., 77 N.M. 384, 389, 423 P.2d 421, 424-25 (1967).
225. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652B (1977).
226. See Froelich v. Werbin, 219 Kan. 461, 464, 548 P.2d 482, 484 (1976); LeCrone v.
Ohio Bell Tel. Co., 120 Ohio App. 129, 131, 201 N.E.2d 533, 536 (1963); Marks v. Bell Tel.
Co., - Pa ... -, & n. - , 331 A.2d 424, 430 & n.8 (1975) (by implication).
227. McCormick v. Haley, 37 Ohio App. 2d 73, 78, 307 N.E.2d 34, 38 (1973).
228. See Thompson v. City of Jacksonville, 130 So. 2d 105, 105-08 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1961), cert. denied, 147 So. 2d 530 (Fla. 1962). See also Lucas v. Ludwig, 313 So. 2d 12,
15 (La. Ct. App.) (intruding conduct which was "improper and unreasonable") (emphasis
added), cert. denied, __ La. - , 318 So. 2d 42 (1975).
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Aside from these cases and the Restatement, analogy to four common
law torts-assault, battery, false imprisonment, and trespass-may pro-
vide some support for a requirement of intent. The tort of assault pro-
tects against the apprehension of harmful and offensive contact with the
plaintiff2 and battery protects against the contact itself.1° False im-
prisonment protects against restraint of free movement.2 3' Thus an as-
sault can result from shaking a fist under the plaintiffs nose, 32 a battery
can result from grabbing an object from the plaintiff's hand,23 and false
imprisonment can result from confining the plaintiff in an automobile.2'
Because none of these involve physical injury, the interests protected by
the torts go beyond mere physical safety. All three torts, in a broad
sense, interfere with a person's right "to be let alone. ' '23. In addition, the
basis of all three torts is the protection of human dignity, inviolability
of personality, and individuality.26 These, essentially, are the interests
underlying a right of privacy.2 37 The fourth tort, trespass, is also relevant
because intrusion upon seclusion often involves entry upon private prop-
erty."'
An obvious argument in favor of requiring intent for actionable inva-
sion of privacy is that intent is the threshold for actionable assault,
229. E.g., Johnson v. Sampson, 167 Minn. 203, 205, 208 N.W. 814, 815 (1926); Cressy
v. Republic Creosoting Co., 108 Minn. 349, 354, 122 N.W. 484, 485 (1909); cf. MINN. STAT.
§ 609.22(1) (1976) (definition of criminal assault).
230. E.g., Smith v. Hubbard, 253 Minn. 215, 225, 91 N.W.2d 756, 764 (1958) (tearing
the shirt and breaking the badge of a police officer is sufficient physical contact to consti-
tute a battery); Mohr v. Williams, 95 Minn. 261, 271, 104 N.W. 12, 15-16 (1905), rev'd
.econd appeal on other grounds, 98 Minn. 494, 108 N.W. 818 (1906).
231. E.g., Lundeen v. Renteria, 302 Minn. 142, 146, 224 N.W.2d 132, 135 (1974) (per
curiam); Durgin v. Cohen, 168 Minn. 77, 79, 209 N.W. 532, 533 (1926); cf. MINN. STAT. §
609.255 (1976) (definition of criminal false imprisonment).
232. See, e.g., Mitchell v. Mitchell, 45 Minn. 50, 47 N.W. 308 (1890), rev'd second
appeal on other grounds, 54 Minn. 301, 55 N.W. 1134 (1893), rev'd on condition third
appeal on other grounds, 60 Minn. 12, 61 N.W. 682 (1895).
233. Morgan v. Loyacomo, 190 Miss. 656, 663, 1 So. 2d 510, 511 (1941) (package); Fisher
v. Carrousel Motor Hotel, Inc., 424 S.W.2d 627, 629 (Tex. 1967) (plate).
234. Jacobson v. Sorenson, 183 Minn. 425, 236 N.W. 922 (1931); cf. Turney v. Rhodes,
42 Ga. App. 104, 155 S.E. 112 (1930) (confinement in an elevator).
235. See T. COOLEY, LAW OF TORTS 29 (2d ed. 1888).
236. Bloustein, supra note 28, at 1005. See also W. PROSSER, HANDBOOK OF THE LAW OF
TORTS §§ 9-11, at 35, 37-38, 42-43 (4th ed. 1971) (assault and battery protect human
"integrity"; false imprisonment protects "dignitary" interests).
237. See, e.g., Kelly v. Johnson Pub. Co., 160 Cal. App. 2d 718, 721, 325 P.2d 659, 661
(1958); Steding v. Battistoni, 3 Conn. Cir. Ct. 76, 79-80, 208 A.2d 559, 561-62 (1964). See
generally Bloustein, supra note 28; Parker, supra note 112. See also Shils, supra note 5,
at 120-21.
238. See, e.g., Ford Motor Co. v. Williams, 108 Ga. App. 21, 29, 132 S.E.2d 206, 211-12
(forced entry into plaintiff's home), rev'd on other grounds, 219 Ga. 505, 134 S.E.2d 32
(1963); Lucas v. Ludwig, 313 So. 2d 12 (La. Ct. App.) (unlawful entry into landlord's
residence by tenant seeking the return of seized property), cert. denied, - La. -'
318 So. 2d 42 (1975).
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battery, and false imprisonment.239 Yet there may be countervailing
arguments. It is arguable that one of the justifications for requiring
intent in connection with assault, battery, and false imprisonment is not
present when privacy is invaded. An intentional assault, battery, or
false imprisonment is much more offensive to human dignity, inviolabil-
ity, and individuality than unintended fright, contact, or confine-
ment." ' Thus the element of intent in these torts may well address the
severity of injury to plaintiff rather than focus on the culpability of
defendant's conduct. Perhaps this is not the case when privacy is in-
vaded. The annoyance from an invasion of privacy might be the same
regardless of how it occurred. Accordingly, the fact that intent is re-
quired to establish actionable assault, battery, and false imprisonment
does not necessarily provide justification for imposing the same require-
ment to establish an actionable invasion of privacy.
Trespass, which is an intentional tort, 41 might support a conclusion
that intent is required for an actionable invasion of privacy. A person
who negligently enters upon another's property cannot be held liable for
trespass,"2 and therefore it might be anomalous to impose liability for
invasion of privacy. On the other hand, it is arguable that intent is
required for trespass only because actual injury to the property is not
required.2 ' Thus if the property is actually damaged by a negligent
trespass, the owner can usually recover merely by changing his theory
from trespass to negligence.2 4 Because an invasion of the plaintiff's
privacy could be caused by a negligent trespass, perhaps recovery should
be allowed even though it was not intentional.
An evaluation of each standard-strict liability, negligence, and in-
tent-results in the conclusion that the court should allow recovery for
239. See, e.g., Blaz v. Molin Concrete Prods. Co., __ Minn. , -, 244 N.W.2d
277, 279 (1976) (false imprisonment); Schumann v. McGinn, __ Minn. -.. 240
N.W.2d 525, 529 (1976) (battery); Dahlin v. Fraser, 206 Minn. 476, 478-79, 288 N.W. 851,
853 (1939) (assault).
240. The intent of the defendant to be offensive is such an important element that
Chief Justice Holt stated in his classic remark: "The least touching of another in anger
is a battery." Cole v. Turner, 87 Eng. Rep. 907, 907 (K.B. 1704). This also appears to be
the law in Minnesota. See Mailand v. Mailand, 83 Minn. 453, 455, 86 N.W. 445,445 (1901)
("An intent to do violence is an essential ingredient of the offense, but the degree of vio-
lence is, of course, immaterial.") (emphasis added).
241. E.g., Victor v. Sell, 301 Minn. 309, 313, 222 N.W.2d 337, 340 (1974); RESTATEMENT
(SEcoND) OF TORTS § 158 (1965).
242. See, e.g., Victor v. Sell, 301 Minn. 309, 222 N.W.2d 337 (1974) (unintentional
placement of a radiator upon plaintiffs property is not an actionable trespass).
243. See, e.g., Sime v. Jensen, 213 Minn. 476, 481, 7 N.W.2d 325, 328 (1942); Whittaker
v. Stangvick, 100 Minn. 386, 389, 111 N.W. 295, 296 (1907); Moe v. Chesrown, 54 Minn.
118, 55 N.W. 832 (1893).
244. See, e.g., Rector of St. Christopher's Episcopal Church v. C.S. McCrossan, Inc.,
- Minn. - , 235 N.W.2d 609 (1975); Waldron v. Page, 191 Minn. 302, 253 N.W. 894
(1934).
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tortious invasion of privacy only if the defendant's physical act involves
some fault. Imposing strict liability in a situation where the defendant
exercised due care to prevent his act would be inconsistent with the
requirements of fault used in connection with torts somewhat analogous
to an invasion of privacy. Moreover, the policy reasons for imposing
strict liability on industries or enterprises having an inevitable or natu-
ral tendency to cause harm are absent in most invasions of privacy.
Whether a standard of negligence rather than intent strikes the proper
balance is a more difficult question. Both standards find support in
existing law and neither would create significant inconsistencies in the
scheme of common law. Still, it is submitted that a negligence standard
strikes the most appropriate balance between the conflicting interests
of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the public. The law may well be too
harsh if intent is required because recovery for even the most devastat-
ing injuries to privacy would be precluded when the defendant acted
unreasonably but not intentionally. Furthermore, a flood of trivial
claims for negligent invasions will not result because a different element
to tortious invasion of privacy requires that the injury be highly offen-
sive."'
d. Conclusion
This Note has considered the strengths and weaknesses of Prosser's
approach to tortious invasion of privacy by evaluating it against the
broader sociopsychological concept of an invasion of privacy.2" As a
result of this evaluation and the reassembly of Prosser's analysis, it was
determined that an invasion of privacy should be potentially actionable
if the defendant intruded into the plaintiff's solitude or seclusion by
subjecting him to unwanted social stimuli, or if the defendant acquired
or disclosed private information without the consent of plaintiff.4 7 It was
also concluded that the truth or falsity of such a disclosure was irrele-
vant to actionability.
2 48
This Note has also considered the limits to which the law will protect
a person's zone of privacy. It was concluded that the invasion should not
be actionable unless it was highly offensive and the plaintiff had both
actual expectations of privacy and objectively reasonable expectations
measured by community mores.2 4
Finally, this Note has considered the fault, if any, which a court
should require as a condition to actionability.2 5 It was concluded that
245. See notes 191-92 supra and accompanying text.
246. See notes 28-54, 122-74 supra and accompanying text.
247. See notes 187-90 supra and accompanying text.
248. See notes 143-53, 188-89 supra and accompanying text.
249. See notes 191-200 supra and accompanying text.
250. See notes 201-45 supra and accompanying text.
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as a general rule, a standard of negligence would be appropriate with
regard to both the foreseeability of injury and the physical accomplish-
ment of the invading act.25 '
Based on this analysis, it is submitted that tortious invasion of pri-
,vacy should be characterized as "intrusion" and "the unauthorized use
of private information." The tort of intrusion provides redress for the
invasion of privacy caused by unwanted sociopsychological inputs.
These inputs might be noise, persons, or other stimuli which prevent the
self from being alone. Here the acquisition or disclosure of private infor-
mation generally is not relevant to actionability.
The tort of unauthorized use of private information, on the other
hand, is designed to provide redress for the invasion of privacy caused
by coerced social outputs. These outputs might consist of unwanted
revelations, loss of anonymity, or other communications of private infor-
mation which thrust the individual into social interaction. Here bom-
bardment with sociopsychological stimuli generally is not relevant to
actionability.
These two torts should have the following elements:
INTRUSION
(1) Interference, physical or otherwise, with the plaintiff's soli-
tude or seclusion;
(2) the physical act of interference was intentionally or negli-
gently accomplished;
(3) the intrusion is highly offensive and objectionable;
(4) the plaintiff had actual subjective expectations of solitude or
seclusion;
(5) the expectations were objectively reasonable according to
community mores.
THE UNAUTHORIZED USE OF PRIVATE INFORMATION
(1) The acquisition or disclosure of information concerning as-
pects of the plaintiff's private life, even if the disclosure is false;
(2) the physical act of acquisition or disclosure was intentionally
or negligently accomplished;
(3) the acquisition or disclosure is highly offensive and
objectionable;
(4) the plaintiff had actual subjective expectations of preventing
the acquisition or disclosure;
(5) the expectations were objectively reasonable according to
community mores.
This is a detailed enumeration of the elements which technically should
be required. Jury instructions, however, could be simplified. 52
251. See text at 204-05 supra.
252. A simplified jury instruction could read:
An invasion of privacy is not unlawful unless it is highly offensive to a reasonable
person. An invasion of privacy occurs if the plaintiff actually and reasonably
[Vol. 4
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Apart from the limitations on recovery inherent in these elements,
additional obstacles to recovery may confront the plaintiff. Two are
particularly significant: constitutional limitations and common law de-
fenses. These obstacles are the next subject of consideration.
IV. CONSTITUTIONAL LIMITATIONS AND COMMON LAW DEFENSES
Recovery for tortious invasion of privacy might be precluded because
of constitutional limitations or common law defenses. The constitu-
tional limitations are derived mainly from the first amendment protec-
tion given to certain types of invading conduct or speech. The common
law defenses, on the other hand, are derived primarily from considera-
tions of the plaintiff's fault, the matter's newsworthiness, and privilege.
A. Constitutional Limitations
The first amendment to the United States Constitution provides:
"Congress shall make no laws . . . abridging the freedom of speech, or
of the press .... 1153 This provision has also been held applicable to
common law abridgments imposed by the states.2 ' Thus, the first
amendment confronts the ability of the states to grant redress for inva-
sions of privacy because the invading conduct might be protected by the
first amendment.
Tortious invasion of privacy has been characterized by this Note as
one, intrusion and two, the unauthorized use of private information.2 5
For the purposes of evaluating constitutional limitations, however, it is
helpful to create three aspects of the tort by dichotomizing the unau-
thorized use of information into the unauthorized acquisition of infor-
mation and the unauthorized disclosure of information because each
aspect involves different types of conduct and first amendment inter-
ests. Each of these three aspects of the tort will be considered separately
to determine the first amendment limitations.
expected to prevent [(interference with his solitude or seclusion) or (the acquisi-
tion or disclosure of information)] and defendant [(interfered with such soli-
tude or seclusion) or (acquired or disclosed the information)] by acting inten-
tionally or by failing to exercise reasonable care.
To avoid complex instructions, the jury should be read only one set of the terms appearing
in the parentheticals above, depending on whether the action is based on intrusion or the
unauthorized use of private information. Further instructions could, of course, be added
to clarify the effect of falsity, fault, or other aspects of the parties' conduct.
253. U.S. CONST. amend. I.
254. See, e.g., Cox Broadcasting Corp. v. Cohn, 420 U.S. 469, 487-97 (1975) (liability
for invasion of privacy); Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323 (1974) (liability for
defamation).
255. See text at 206 supra.
45
et al.: Tortious Invasion of Privacy: Minnesota as a Model
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1978
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
1. The First Amendment Limitations on an Action for Intrusion
Liability could be imposed under the tort of intrusion when a person's
solitude or seclusion is invaded by unwanted stimuli.25 It is clear, how-
ever, that the first amendment will afford some protection against liabil-
ity when the intrusive conduct involves the communication of ideas.
The basic test is whether the limits placed on the communication are
reasonable as to "time, place and manner." '257 Thus, the extent of first
amendment protection will vary, depending upon where the person
seeks solitude and seclusion.
One first amendment limitation arising from this principle is that the
plaintiff must have been a member of a "captive audience" at the time
his solitude or seclusion was invaded.2 The concept of captive audience
describes a situation in which reasonable steps to avoid the intrusive
speech or conduct are unavailing. "9 The geographical area where the
plaintiff seeks solitude or seclusion is an important factor in determin-
ing the reasonableness of taking steps to avoid the intrusive speech or
first amendment conduct.
A person probably is most "captive" in his own home; therefore the
first amendment probably affords the least protection when the intru-
sion is into the solitude and seclusion of the home. In recognition of
substantial privacy interests while at home, courts have upheld the
constitutionality of narrowly drawn statutes and ordinances which for-
bid activities such as the use of sound amplification devices in residen-
tial areas,6 0 door-to-door solicitation, 6' residential picketing, 62 and the
256. See id.
257. See, e.g., Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S. 104, 115 (1972); Adderley v.
Florida, 385 U.S. 39, 46-48 & n.6 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536, 558 (1965).
258. See Haiman, Speech v. Privacy: Is There a Right Not to be Spoken To?, 67 Nw.
U.L. REV. 153, 193-95 (1972); note 269 infra. For a discussion of the cases considering the
question of whether a person is part of a "captive audience," see Orazio v. Town of North
Hempstead, 426 F. Supp. 1144, 1148-49 (E.D.N.Y. 1977).
259. See Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451, 468 (Douglas, J., dissenting).
See generally Haiman, supra note 258, at 177-85.
260. See Kovacs v. Cooper, 336 U.S. 77 (1949); NAACP v. City of Chester, 253 F. Supp.
707 (E.D. Pa. 1966); Haggerty v. Associated Farmers, Inc., 44 Cal. 2d 60, 279 P.2d 734
(1955) (in bank).
An absolute or standardless prohibition of sound amplification devices will, however,
be struck down as unconstitutionally vague or overbroad. See Saia v. New York, 334 U.S.
558 (1948); United States Labor Party v. Rochford, 416 F. Supp. 204, 206-08 (N.D. Ill.
1975); Maldonado v. County of Monterey, 330 F. Supp. 1282, 1284-87 (N.D. Cal. 1971);
Phillips v. Township of Darby, 305 F. Supp. 763 (E.D. Pa. 1969); Wollam v. City of Palm
Springs, 59 Cal. 2d 276, 379 P.2d 481, 29 Cal. Rptr. 1 (1963) (in bank).
261. See Breard v. Alexandria, 341 U.S. 622, 641-45 (1951); Town of Green River v.
Fuller Brush Co., 65 F.2d 112 (10th Cir. 1933). See also Hynes v. Mayor of Oradell, 96 S.
Ct. 1755, 1759 (1976) (reasonable limitations can be imposed on door-to-door solicitation,
but the limitations must be narrow and specific).
However, if the door-to-door solicitation involves religious, political, or charitable pur-
poses, the Court might give it greater first amendment protection and strike down broad
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mailing of sexually explicit materials over the protest of the addressee."'
As Chief Justice Burger has said, "[t]he ancient concept that 'a man's
home is his castle' into which 'not even the king may enter' has lost none
of its vitality . ... "264 A tortious intrusion into the home, therefore,
probably is not protected by the first amendment.
When a person leaves the sanctity of his home, however, the courts
have been willing to give greater first amendment protection to intrusive
communications. In Erznoznik v. City of Jacksonsville"5 the Court ob-
served :2"
[Slelective restrictions have been upheld only when the speaker in-
trudes on the privacy of the home or the degree of captivity makes it
impractical for the unwilling viewer or auditor to avoid exposure ....
The plain, if at times disquieting, truth is that in our pluralistic
society, constantly proliferating new and ingenious forms of expression,
"we are inescapably captive audiences for many purposes." Much that
we encounter offends our esthetic, if not our political and moral, sensi-
bilities. Nevertheless, the Constitution does not permit government to
decide which types of otherwise protected speech are sufficiently offen-
sive to require protection for the unwilling listener or viewer. Rather,
ordinances which preclude such activity. See Martin v. City of Struthers, 319 U.S. 141
(1943); Schneider v. State, 308 U.S. 147 (1939); Haiman, supra note 258, at 160. See also
Organization for a Better Austin v. Keefe, 402 U.S. 415 (1971) (state cannot enjoin the
peaceful distribution of leaflets near the residence of a "blockbusting" realtor).
262. See Garcia v. Gray, 507 F.2d 539 (10th Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 971 (1975);
DeGregory v. Giesing, 427 F. Supp. 910 (D. Conn. 1977). See also Abernathy v. Conroy,
429 F.2d 1170, 1173-74 (4th Cir. 1970) (ordinance prohibiting peaceful parades after eight
p.m. is constitutional because of the substantial public interest in rest, relaxation, and
prevention of crime).
Residential picketing might be prosecuted under statutes prohibiting disorderly con-
duct. The Minnesota Supreme Court has sustained three convictions on this theory with-
out discussing any first amendment limitations. See State v. Cooper, 205 Minn. 333, 285
N.W. 903 (1939); State v. Perry, 196 Minn. 481, 265 N.W. 302 (1936) (per curiam); State
v. Zanker, 179 Minn. 355, 229 N.W. 311 (1930).
263. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 735-38 (1970); United
States v. Treatman, 408 F. Supp. 944 (C.D. Cal. 1976); Pent-R-Books, Inc. v. United
States Postal Serv., 328 F. Supp. 297 (E.D.N.Y. 1971). See generally Note, Federal Pan-
dering Advertisements Statute: The Right of Privacy Versus the First Amendment, 32
OHIO ST. L.J. 149 (1971).
264. Rowan v. United States Post Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 737 (1970). Similarly,
Justice Black has said:
I believe that the homes of men, sometimes the last citadel of the tired, the
weary, and the sick, can be protected by government from noisy, marching,
tramping, threatening picketers and demonstrators bent on filling the minds of
men, women, and children with fears of the unknown.
Gregory v. City of Chicago, 394 U.S. 111, 125-26 (1969) (Black, J., concurring).
265. 422 U.S. 205 (1975).
266. Id. at 209-11 (citations omitted) (quoting in part Rowan v. United States Post
Office Dep't, 397 U.S. 728, 736 (1970) and Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15, 21 (1971)).
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.. .the burden normally falls on the viewer to "avoid further bom-
bardment .... "
Consistent with these principles, the Court has made it clear that peace-
ful picketing"7 and handbilling 6 8 are protected by the first amendment
when conducted in an area open to the public, though such activities
admittedly disrupt peace and tranquility. Also, constant intrusions into
a bus or other public transit vehicle might be protected by the first
amendment."9
Even if the plaintiff arguably is a member of a captive audience at
the time of the intrusion, the 1971 case of Cohen v. California27 indicates
an additional first amendment limitation on recovery for intrusion. In
Cohen the defendant had been convicted of breach of the peace after he
wore on the back of his jacket, while in a courthouse, an emblem reading
"Fuck the Draft." The United States Supreme Court reversed the con-
viction on the grounds that it violated the first amendment. Because the
offensiveness could have been avoided merely by looking away from the
emblem, the Court rejected the argument that such communications
should be prevented to protect the sensitivities of unwilling recipients.2
In addition, however, the Court went on to say that first amendment
protection can be overcome only if "substantial privacy interests are
being invaded in an essentially intolerable manner.
' ' 2
267. E.g., Food Employees Union Local 590 v. Logan Valley Plaza, Inc., 391 U.S. 308
(1968) (picketing at privately owned shopping center); Thornhill v. Alabama, 310 U.S. 88,
101-06 (1940); Starr v. Cooks, Waiters, Waitresses & Helpers Union Local 458, 244 Minn.
558, 564-65, 70 N.W.2d 873, 877-78 (1955).
268. E.g., Jamison v. Texas, 318 U.S. 413 (1943); Lovell v. City of Griffin, 303 U.S. 444
(1938); Albany Welfare Rights Org. v. Wyman, 493 F.2d 1319 (2d. Cir.), cert. denied, 419
U.S. 838 (1974); Farmer v. Moses, 232 F. Supp. 154, 161-62 (S.D.N.Y. 1964).
269. In Public Utils. Comm'n v. Pollak, 343 U.S. 451 (1952) a city government permit-
ted the use of radio broadcasts in public buses after it concluded that they did not interfere
with the comfort and safety of the riders. Thus the Court was not addressing the issue of
whether a state could prohibit such broadcasts, but rather whether the radio broadcasts
violated the riders' fifth amendment right of privacy. The Court found that it did not and
said: "However complete his right of privacy may be at home, it is substantially limited
by the rights of others when its possessor travels on a public thoroughfare or rides in a
public conveyance." Id. at 464. In a vigorous dissent, Justice Douglas indicated that the
broadcasts should be prohibited where an unwilling listener is part of a "captive audi-
ence." Id. at 468.
The concept of "captive audience" was subsequently used by the Court in sustaining
the constitutionality of prohibitions against political advertisements in the facilities of a
rapid transit system. See Lehman v. City of Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298 (1974). The
Court had stated, however, that "[n]o First Amendment forum is here to be found"
because the communication consisted of advertising rather than protected speech. Id. at
304.
It is not clear, therefore, whether instrusive speech or expression on public transit
vehicles may be proscribed without violating the first amendment.
270. 403 U.S. 15 (1971).
271. Id. at 21.
272. Id. (emphasis added).
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This analysis reveals that the Constitution precludes liability for in-
trusive speech or other first amendment conduct if it occurs in a rela-
tively public area or if it does not invade substantial privacy interests
in an intolerable manner. Still, these limitations do not significantly
affect the tort of intrusion proposed by this Note. The tort proposed by
this Note, like the constitutional limitation, tends to deny recovery as
the area where plaintiff seeks solitude or seclusion becomes more public
because generally a plaintiff seeking solitude or seclusion in a public
area cannot satisfy the tort requirement that his expectation of solitude
or seclusion be reasonable.3 In addition, the tort proposed by this Note
allows recovery only for intrusions which invade substantial privacy
interests because the tort requires a "highly offensive" intrusion.
7 4
Moreover, it must be remembered that many intrusions, such as noise,
might not involve first amendment speech or conduct at all.
2. The First Amendment Limitations on an Action for the
Unauthorized Acquisition of Private Information
The unauthorized acquisition of private information is a second as-
pect of tortious invasion of privacy. The first amendment might limit
liability for this tort because the Court has recognized a narrow first
amendment right to gather information.
275
It is clear that the first amendment affords the press a right to gather
information from sources willing to disclose it. In Branzburg v. Hayes,
276
the Court was confronted with the issue of whether journalists could be
compelled to appear before grand juries and reveal their sources of news
stories involving crimes or suspected criminal activity. The Court held
that journalists could be so compelled. However, the Court cautioned
that news gathering is afforded some first amendment protection, and
therefore the government cannot force such testimony unless it has a
compelling need and can show both that a crime has been committed
and that the journalist has information concerning it which cannot be
obtained from alternative sources.277 "[W]ithout some protection for
273. See text at 206 supra. See also notes 193-200 supra and accompanying text.
274. See text at 206 supra.
275. For a general discussion of the first amendment right of access to the news, see
Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 775-78 (M.D. Ala. 1973); Note, The Right of the Press
to Gather Information, 71 COLUM. L. REv. 838 (1971).
276. 408 U.S. 665 (1972).
277. Id. at 707 n.41. In response to the Branzburg decision, the Minnesota Legislature
passed a statute which allows a member of the news media to protect the anonymity of
his sources unless there is probable cause to believe he has information on a violation of
law other than a misdemeanor, the information cannot be obtained by another source, and
there is a compelling interest in requiring the disclosure of the information. See MINN.
STAT. § 595.024 (1976).
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seeking out the news," said the Court, "freedom of the press could be
eviscerated."25
It is relatively clear from Branzburg that the first amendment right
to gather news is very narrow. Thus, the Court in Zemel v. Rusk 9
rejected an argument that the first amendment right to gather news
about foreign policy justifies the issuance of a passport. The Court
stated: "The right to speak and publish does not carry with it the unre-
strained right to gather information. '28 ° Therefore, in the context of tor-
tious invasion of privacy, the issue confronting the courts is whether this
narrow first amendment right to gather information from willing sources
extends to the gathering of private information from unwilling sources.
Although not directly on point, the Supreme Court's view on the right
to interview prisoners is instructive on the legitimate scope of the right
to gather private information. In Pell v. Procunier,211 the Court consid-
ered the validity of a prison regulation which allowed the media to
interview inmates on the condition that the media not select the partic-
ular inmate and the inmate not initiate the interview. The purpose of
the condition was to avoid the notoriety and attendant disciplinary
problems which could result from media exposure.21 2 The Court sus-
tained the regulation, stating:
23
The First and Fourteenth Amendments bar government from interfer-
ing in any way with a free press. The Constitution does not, however,
require government to accord the press special access to information
not shared by members of the public generally. It is one thing to say
that a journalist is free to seek out sources of information not available
to members of the general public, that he is entitled to some constitu-
tional protection of the confidentiality of such sources, and that govern-
ment cannot restrain the publication of news emanating from such
sources. It is quite another thing to suggest that the Constitution im-
poses upon government the affirmative duty to make available to jour-
278. 408 U.S. at 681. The Court also stated in dictum, however, that the press can be
excluded, for example, from grand jury proceedings, court conferences, and certain meet-
ings of official organizations even though news gathering is impaired. Id. at 684.
279. 381 U.S. 1 (1965).
280. Id. at 17.
281. 417 U.S. 817 (1974).
282. Id. at 831-32.
283. Id. at 834-35 (citations omitted); accord, e.g., Branzburg v. Hayes, 408 U.S. 665,
684 (1972) ("It has generally been held that the First Amendment does not guarantee the
press a constitutional right of special access to information not available to the public
generally."); Channel 10, Inc. v. Gunnarson, 337 F. Supp. 634, 638 (D. Minn. 1972) (the
press has the right to gather news in a public area). Pell was followed in a similar case
decided the same day by the Supreme Court. See Saxbe v. Washington Post Co., 417 U.S.
843, 850 (1974). See also Newspaper Guild Loqal 82 v. Parker, 480 F.2d 1062, 1066-67 (9th
Cir. 1973) (state may deny media an interview with inmates confined in areas of maximum
security).
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nalists sources of information not available to members of the public
generally. That proposition finds no support in the words of the Consti-
tution or in any decision of this Court.
This language indicates that the first amendment will protect the acqui-
sition of information from voluntary sources who wish to remain anony-
mous, but the first amendment does not require that government afford
the media a special privilege to obtain information which is not avail-
able to the general public. In accordance with this view, lower courts
have not hesitated to deny first amendment protection in cases for inva-
sion of privacy where the unauthorized acquisition of information in-
volved private information not accessible to the general public.
2 4
Two leading federal cases which denied first amendment protection
in this situation are Dietemann v. Time, Inc.
2 " and Galella v. Onassis.2 16
In Dietemann, journalists from Life magazine deceitfully entered plain-
tiff's home to investigate plaintiff's illegal practice of medicine. The
plaintiff was led to believe they were friends of an acquaintance seeking
treatment; he did not know they were journalists or had hidden cam-
eras. When Life published the pictures and a news account of the inves-
tigation, plaintiff brought an action for invasion of privacy. Life con-
tended that the first amendment right to publish news includes the right
to acquire it. The court of appeals conceded the media's right to publish
newsworthy material, but rejected the argument that it also gave the
media a right to invade a person's privacy to acquire it. "The First
Amendment," said the court, "has never been construed to accord news-
men immunity from torts or crimes committed during newsgathering.
The First Amendment is not a license to trespass, to steal, or to intrude
by electronic means into the precincts of another's home or office." 87
In Galella, a photographer brought an action in a federal district court
seeking damages for false arrest and malicious prosecution and an in-
junction against defendant Jacqueline Onassis from interfering with his
efforts to photograph her while she was in public areas. Onassis counter-
claimed for damages and injunctive relief, alleging in part that plaintiff
had invaded and would continue to invade her privacy by his constant
snooping and taking of photographs. In evaluating the merits of the
counterclaim, the court determined that the photographer's first
284. Garland v. Torre, 259 F.2d 545, 548 n.4 (2d Cir.) ("[A] journalist's professional
status does not entitle him to sources of news inaccessible to others."), cert. denied, 358
U.S. 910 (1958); Lewis v. Baxley, 368 F. Supp. 768, 777 (M.D. Ala. 1973) ("[N]ewsmen
have a right to go where the public generally may go ...."); Trimble v. Johnston, 173
F. Supp. 651, 656 (D.D.C. 1959) ("[Tlhe Constitutional privilege of freedom of the press
does not include a right on the part of representatives of the press to inspect documents
not open to members of the public generally.").
285. 449 F.2d 245 (9th Cir. 1971).
286. 353 F. Supp. 196 (S.D.N.Y. 1972), modified, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
287. 449 F.2d at 249.
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amendment interests were outweighed by her privacy interests and
therefore the first amendment would not be violated by enjoining his
conduct."' The court seemed to rely on the lack of legitimate public
interest in the information acquired by the plaintiff photographer.2 " On
appeal to the Second Circuit, the court affirmed the holding that an
injunction could be imposed, although it modified its scope.290 The Sec-
ond Circuit summarily rejected the plaintiff's argument that his con-
duct was protected by the first amendment because "[c]rimes and
torts committed in news gathering are not protected." ''
The decisions of the Supreme Court and other courts indicate the first
amendment probably will not limit an action in tort for the unauthor-
ized acquisition of private information. The only significant first
amendment limitation is that liability cannot be imposed if the ac-
quired information would have been available to the general public. By
its very definition, however, information which is available to the gen-
eral public cannot be private; therefore first amendment limitations will
rarely, if ever, be available in an action for tortious acquisition of private
information.
3. The First Amendment Limitations on an Action for the
Unauthorized Disclosure of Private Information
Liability for tortious invasion of privacy also can be based on the
unauthorized disclosure of private information. The determination of
the first amendment limitations on this liability requires the resolution
of several complex issues. Two issues relate solely to the content of the
publication. One of these is whether the first amendment provides abso-
lute protection to the publication of truthful statements. If it does not,
the second issue concerns the relationship between newsworthiness and
first amendment protection. A third issue relates to the fault of the
defendant rather than solely to the content of the statement. These
issues are discussed below.
a. Does the First Amendment Afford Absolute Protection to Truth?
One issue which has not been resolved by the United States Supreme
Court is whether truthful publications of private fact are absolutely
protected by the first amendment. In the 1975 decision of Cox Broad-
casting Corp. v. Cohn, " the defendant violated a Georgia criminal stat-
ute by publishing a rape victim's name appearing on public record. The
victim's parents brought a civil action under a Georgia statute which
288. See 353 F. Supp. at 223-26.
289. See id. at 225-26.
290. See Galella v. Onassis, 487 F.2d 986 (2d Cir. 1973).
291. Id. at 995.
292. 420 U.S. 469 (1975).
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seemed to allow civil redress for violation of a criminal statute. The
Georgia Supreme Court held that a civil action could not be based on
the statute, but could be based on a common law tort. The United
States Supreme Court granted certiorari to consider the issue of whether
first amendment protections precluded liability for publication of the
victim's name appearing on public record. Because the publication was
found to be true and accurate, the Court recognized the seemingly irre-
concilable conflict between the first amendment and privacy. It said:
29 3
Because the gravamen of the claimed injury is the publication of infor-
mation, whether true or not, the dissemination of which is embarrass-
ing or otherwise painful to an individual, it is here that claims of pri-
vacy most directly confront the constitutional freedoms of speech and
press. The face-off is apparent ....
The appellants in Cox had argued that truth was an absolute defense
under the first amendment.29 ' The Court, however, confined itself to the
narrow issue presented and held that a state cannot impose liability for
the accurate publication of a fact on public record. 25 Thus, the Court
left open the broader question of "whether truthful publications may
ever be subjected to civil or criminal liability consistently with the First
and Fourteenth Amendments, or to put it another way, whether the
State may ever define and protect an area of privacy free from unwanted
publicity in the press .... 211
Since Cox, the Ninth Circuit 297 and a Minnesota Federal District
Court" 8 have taken the position that truthful publications of private fact
are not absolutely protected under the first amendment. A strong argu-
ment can be made against absolute protection to truthful publications
because the first amendment has never been construed as granting an
absolute right to publish statements which present a clear and present
danger to compelling state interests. " In addition, analogy to Supreme
Court decisions on obscenity is persuasive of a conclusion that truth, in
itself, will not afford an absolute first amendment defense to privacy
actions. Cases concerning the proscription of obscenity are relevant be-
cause when a state proscribes the publication of obscenity or of private
facts, it is inhibiting the disclosure of accurate information in the inter-
est of public welfare. Because the present posture of the Supreme Court
is that states can proscribe obscenity, 09 it should follow that truthful
293. Id. at 489.
294. See id.
295. See id. at 489-91.
296. Id. at 491.
297. See Virgil v. Time, Inc., 527 F.2d 1122, 1127-28 (9th Cir. 1975), cert. denied, 425
U.S. 998 (1976).
298. See Benner v. NBC, No. 4-72-67, slip op. at 10 (D. Minn. June 18, 1975).
299. See, e.g., Chaplinsky v. New Hampshire, 315 U.S. 568, 572 (1942).
300. A state may proscribe the publication of material which satisfies the following
19781
53
et al.: Tortious Invasion of Privacy: Minnesota as a Model
Published by Mitchell Hamline Open Access, 1978
WILLIAM MITCHELL LAW REVIEW
publications of private fact are not absolutely protected by the first
amendment.
The 1977 case of Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co.310 also
supports a conclusion that truth is not absolutely protected under the
first amendment. In Zacchini, an entertainer in a "human cannonball"
act brought an action to recover damages after the defendant televised
his entire act contrary to his request that it not be filmed or televised.
The Ohio Supreme Court gave judgment to defendant television station
on the basis of first amendment privilege to report newsworthy events. 2
The United States Supreme Court reversed, holding that the first
amendment did not protect the appropriation of the plaintiff's pecuni-
ary rights in his profession. "The Constitution," the Court said, "no
more prevents a State from requiring [the defendant] to compensate
[the plaintiff] for broadcasting his act on television than it would privi-
lege [the defendant] to film and broadcast a copyrighted dramatic
work without liability to the copyright owner. 30 3 Although this broad-
cast involved the commercial appropriation of a property right rather
than an invasion of privacy,3' 4 implicit in the Court's holding is a recog-
nition that even truthful publications may be without first amendment
protection when they interfere with sufficiently compelling personal
rights.
In conclusion, therefore, a defendant probably will not be able to
invoke the first amendment protection against liability for the unau-
thorized disclosure of private information merely on the basis that the
disclosure is true.
b. Newsworthiness as a Limitation
Although the first amendment probably does not afford absolute pro-
tection to truthful publications of private facts, Supreme Court deci-
sions and lower court decisions indicate the publication of private infor-
mation will be afforded first amendment protection on another basis.
The Court's decisions in areas of obscenity and defamation demonstrate
a concern for protecting the discussion of public controversies and is-
sues. Under the Court's present test for obscenity, a state carnot pro-
scribe the publication of information which has serious literary, artistic,
requirements: (1) the average person, applying contemporary community standards, finds
that the work as a whole appeals to the prurient interest; (2) the work depicts or describes,
in a patently offensive way, sexual conduct specifically defined by applicable state law;
and (3) the work as a whole lacks serious literary, artistic, political, or scientific value.
Miller v. California, 413 U.S. 15, 24 (1973).
301. 97 S. Ct. 2849 (1977).
302. 47 Ohio St. 2d 224, 233-36, 351 N.E.2d 454, 460-62 (1976).
303. 97 S. Ct. at 2857.
304. See 97 S. Ct. at 2854-56; notes 154-74 supra and accompanying text.
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political, or scientific value.30' Under the defamation decisions, the dis-
cussion of public officials and other persons involved in public contro-
versies receives more protection against defamation liability than the
discussion of purely personal matters or matters in which the public is
merely curious.3
In accord with these principles, many courts have denied recovery for
an invasion of privacy when the published matter is "newsworthy" or
of "legitimate public interest." Although this limitation can be criti-
cized because it involves an ad hoc balancing of the competing interests
on a case-by-case basis,S1 it has received the support of some legal
authorities.30 In addition, courts seem to recognize several guiding prin-
ciples in balancing the first amendment interests against the privacy
interests.
One principle is that the plaintiff's name generally should be withheld
from publication of private fact when a disclosure of the event, and not
the participant, serves a legitimate public interest.310 Thus a person's
name should be important only when relevant to the public's interest
in altering any relationship with the person because of his private be-
havior .
31
305. See note 300 supra.
306. See notes 312-16 infra and accompanying text.
307. See, e.g., Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967) (first amendment protections
apply to "matters of public interest"); Pearson v. Dodd, 410 F.2d 701, 703 (D.C. Cir.),
cert. denied, 395 U.S. 947 (1969); Varnish v. Best Medium Pub. Co., 405 F.2d 608, 611
(2d Cir. 1968), cert. denied, 394 U.S. 987 (1969); Fletcher v. Florida Pub. Co., 319 So. 2d
100, 111 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1975), rev'd in part on other grounds, 340 So. 2d 914 (Fla.
1976), cert. denied, 97 S. Ct. 2634 (1977); Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 59 Misc.
2d 444, 447-50, 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 506 (Sup. Ct. 1968).
308. "Ad hoc" balancing of the plaintiff's right of privacy against the public's right to
know causes an objectionable chilling effect because the press might be unable to deter-
mine, before publication, whether the interests weigh in its favor. Nimmer, supra note 144,
at 944.
309. See, e.g., RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 652D (1977); Pember & Teeter,
Privacy and the Press Since Time, Inc. v. Hill, 50 WASH. L. REv. 57, 76-77 (1974). A leading
authority, Alexander Meiklejohn, viewed the first amendment as protecting the public's
right to hear information which is relevant to self-government in a democratic society, not
the speaker's right to express himself. See Meiklejohn, The First Amendment is an
Absolute, 1961 SuP. CT. REv. 245, 255. See generally A. MEIKLEJOHN, POLMcAL FREEDOM
(1960). Meiklejohn's analysis has received the applause of several writers on the subject.
See, e.g., Bloustein, The First Amendment and Privacy: The Supreme Court Justice and
the Philosopher, 28 RUTGERS L. REv. 41 passim (1974); Comment, Privacy: The Search
for a Standard, 11 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 659, 670-72 (1975).
310. See Briscoe v. Reader's Digest Ass'n, 4 Cal. 3d 529, 537-38, 483 P.2d 34, 39-40, 93
Cal. Rptr. 866, 871-72 (1971) (in bank); Deaton v. Delta Democrat Pub. Co., 326 So. 2d
471, 474 (Miss. 1976); Barber v. Time, Inc., 348 Mo. 1199, 1207, 159 S.W.2d 291, 295
(1942); Bloustein, Privacy, Tort Law, and the Constitution: Is Warren & Brandeis' Tort
Petty and Unconstitutional as Well?, 46 TEX. L. REv. 611, 623 (1968); Comment, supra
note 309, at 684.
311. Bloustein, supra note 309, at 58-61 (name should be disclosed only when it serves
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Because a democratic society depends on the free flow of information
relating to the administration of government and public business, a
second principle is that the first amendment protects the disclosure of
information concerning public officials. " Thus, a publisher should gen-
erally not be liable for an invasion of privacy when the disclosed infor-
mation relates to official conduct of any kind3 3 or to private conduct
which touches the official's fitness for public office.
3 1'
A third principle is that the plaintiff's notoriety will affect the deter-
mination of newsworthiness. The Supreme Court's defamation decisions
have created two categories of public figures. One category consists of
those who "occupy positions of such persuasive power and influence that
they are deemed public figures for all purposes"; the other category
consists of those who "thrust themselves to the forefront of particular
public controversies in order to influence the resolution of the issues
involved. 3 1 5 Defamatory publications which relate to the public activi-
ties of such persons receive greater first amendment protection than
publications which relate only to a person's private affairs. " By anal-
ogy, the courts should be more willing to find newsworthiness if the
private information is directly related to the public conduct of the gen-
eral public figure or to the conduct of the limited public figure which
touches on his participation in the public controversy."'
In summary, the first amendment will afford significant protection
against liability for the unauthorized disclosure of private information
the public's need to know for self-governing purposes); Franklin, A Constitutional Prob-
lem in Privacy Protection: Legal Inhibitions on Reporting of Fact, 16 STAN. L. REV. 107,
128-30 (1963) (public interest in a rape victim's name differs from its interest in a prosti-
tute's name because the public would not alter its behavior with regard to the former but
should be allowed to take precautionary steps with regard to the latter).
312. See, e.g., New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964); Mahnke v. North-
west Pubs., Inc., 280 Minn. 328, 160 N.W.2d 1 (1968).
313. See New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964) (first amendment analy-
sis and holding limited to defamatory statements which concern the official conduct of
public officials).
314. See Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64, 76-77 (1964); Moore, supra note 112, at 22;
Note, supra note 139, at 96 & n.137. See also Klaus v. Minnesota State Ethics Comm'n,
- Minn. -, 244 N.W.2d 672 (1976) (statute requiring a candidate for public office
to disclose certain financial interests is not an unconstitutional invasion of privacy; there
are compelling state interests in giving the electorate "some insight into a candidate's
potential conflicts of interest").
315. Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 345 (1974); see Curtis Pub. Co. v. Butts,
388 U.S. 130, 155 (1967). See also Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 454-55 (1976)
(discussing the nature of a "public" controversy).
316. See Time, Inc. v. Firestone, 424 U.S. 448, 452-55 (1976) (negligence, rather than
recklessness, is required when a person seeks recovery for defamation from publication of
a false statement which concerns only private matters rather than a public controversy);
Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 347 (1974) (same).
317. See, e.g., Industrial Foundation v. Texas Indus. Accident Bd., 540 S.W.2d 668,
684-85 (Tex. 1976), cert. denied, 45 U.S.L.W. 3634 (U.S. Mar. 22, 1977) (No. 76-840).
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if the information is newsworthy. The limitation probably is available
when information relates to a contemporary issue or controversy of pub-
lic importance. Thus, private facts concerning public officials and pub-
lic figures tend to be more newsworthy than facts concerning purely
private individuals.
c. Protection against Strict Liability
Prior to 1964, states could impose strict liability for publication of a
statement which was false and defamatory. In the 1964 decision of New
York Times Co. v. Sullivan,3 " however, the United States Supreme
Court held that a public, official could not recover for a false and defam-
atory statement directed at his official conduct unless he proved actual
malice, that is, that the publisher was at least reckless in failing to
discover the statement was false. 1'9 The Court's rationale was that criti-
cism of government is the very essence of the first amendment and it
must be afforded sufficient "breathing space" by precluding defamation
liability when the publisher innocently publishes a statement which he
has no reason to believe is false.320
In 1967 the Court extended the actual malice requirement in Curtis
Publishing Co. v: Butts32 ' to defamation actions brought by "public
figures." The rationale was that public figures also command public
interest analogous to public officials, either because of their notoriety
alone or because they have thrust themselves into the vortex of impor-
tant public controversies.
32 2
In 1971 the Court examined the extent of first amendment protections
in a defamation action brought by a private individual who was neither
a public official nor a public figure. In Rosenbloom v. Metromedia,
Inc.,"' a plurality of the Court held that the New York Times actual
malice requirement also applies to a defamation action brought by a
private individual if the defamation involves "an issue of public or
general concern. '324 Three years later, however, the composition of the
Court had changed and it reconsidered the sweeping "public concern"
test set forth in Rosenbloom. Thus in the 1974 decision of Gertz v.
Robert Welch, Inc.,32 the Court found that the rule set forth in
Rosenbloom wasunworkable and that the states may constitutionally
318. 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
319. Id. at 279-80.
320. Id. at 270-72.
321. 388 U.S. 130 (1967). Although Justice Harlan's opinion states a standard of fault
slightly different than actual malice, id. at 155, that standard did not receive the support
of a majority of the justices.
322. Id. at 154-55.
323. 403 U.S. 29 (1971).
324. Id. at 44-45.
325. 418 U.S. 323 (1974).
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impose liability for defamation of a private individual upon a showing
of negligence rather than actual malice.2 6 Actual malice is constitution-
ally required only in defamation actions brought by public officials or
public figures, although damages recoverable by a private individual are
limited to "actual injury" if only negligence is shown.2 7
These cases raise two issues concerning the first amendment require-
ments when a plaintiff seeks to recover for the publication of private
facts. One issue is whether actual malice or negligence must be proven
with regard to falsity, and the second issue involves a determination of
the scope of the fault requirement.
If the publication of a private fact is false, it is arguable that a plain-
tiff cannot recover for an invasion of privacy unless he shows the pub-
lisher was at fault in failing to ascertain the statement's falsity. In 1967,
the actual malice requirement made its way into a suit brought for such
a publication, which has sometimes been referred to as a "false light"
claim.3 28 In Time, Inc. v. Hill,39 defendant had published fictional exag-
gerations along with an arcurate account of the desperation which the
plaintiff's family underwent when escaped convicts entered his home
and kept his family hostage. The plaintiff brought an action under a
New York statute which imposes liability for "fictitious" publications
concerning a newsworthy person. 310 The United States Supreme Court
held that liability could not be imposed under the statute unless the
defendant acted with actual malice.33' Although the plaintiff in Hill did
not have a public status like the plaintiffs in New York Times and
Butts, the Court reasoned that the first amendment protects publica-
tions involving a matter of "public interest.
'
3
2
Hill was decided before Gertz. Shortly after Gertz, the Court in
Cantrell v. Forest City Publishing Co.3 3 was confronted with an action
similar to that in Hill. In Cantrell one of the issues was whether, in view
of Gertz, a private plaintiff could recover for a "false light" invasion of
privacy upon a showing of negligent failure to ascertain falsity rather
326. Id. at 347.
327. See id. at 348-50.
328. For a discussion of the "false light" theory of recovery, see notes 131-53 supra and
accompanying text.
329. 385 U.S. 374 (1967).
330. N.Y. Civ. RIGHTS LAW §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1976) prohibits the unauthorized use
of a person's name or likeness, but the statute has been judicially construed as allowing
recovery for reports of newsworthy persons only if the report is false. See Spahn v. Julian
Messner, Inc., 18 N.Y.2d 324, 328, 221 N.E.2d 543, 545, 274 N.Y.S.2d 877, 879 (1966),
vacated per curiam, 387 U.S. 239 (1967), aff'd, 21 N.Y.2d 124, 233 N.E.2d 840, 286
N.Y.S.2d 832 (1967), prob. juris. noted, 393 U.S. 818 (1968), appeal dismissed per
stipulation, 393 U.S. 1046 (1969).
331. 385 U.S. at 387-88.
332. Id. at 388.
333. 419 U.S. 245 (1974).
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than actual malice. The Court circumvented the issue, however, on the
grounds that no objection was made to trial instructions requiring actual
malice.33'
Both Hill and Cantrell have a common element. In each case the
falsity of the publication was a necessary element to the imposition of
liability. In Hill, a privacy statute required falsity; in Cantrell the tort
of "false light" required falsity. The relevance of these cases is therefore
drastically reduced if state privacy law does not require falsity as a
condition to liability. The tort of unauthorized disclosure of private
information proposed by this Note makes falsity irrelevant in ascertain-
ing liability.m The crux of a privacy action is that a private aspect of
one's life has been revealed to others. The accuracy of the revelation is
not important. Upon these premises, it is submitted that the constitu-
tional requirement of proving fault with regard to falsity should not be
applied to a privacy claim which does not even require falsity as a
condition to actionability.
The second first amendment issue is whether the New York Times,
Butts, and Gertz requirements of recklessness or negligence extend be-
yond the context of falsity into the other elements of an actionable
publication. The Court in Gertz held that states could not impose strict
liability for defamation and that some "fault" must be proven by the
plaintiff.33 Although the Court was undoubtedly referring to fault in the
context of falsity, 337 most authorities have concluded that the spirit of
Gertz requires fault in all the elements of an action for defamation.3
By analogy, therefore, a plaintiff could not recover for the publication
of private facts if the publisher accidentally and nonnegligently pub-
lished the statement, referred to the plaintiff, or failed to realize that
the publication contained private facts.39 This analogy seems appropri-
ate because the press would be afforded the "breathing space" which
underlies the Court's analysis in New York Times, Butts, and Gertz.
Furthermore, if a court applies a standard of recklessness to the com-
mon law elements of a privacy action, there are no constitutional limita-
tions on damages. If a common law standard of negligence is selected,
334. Id. at 249-51.
335. See text at 206 supra.
336. 418 U.S. at 347.
337. Id. at 325-32 (certiorari granted to reconsider the issue of whether plaintiff had to
prove defendant's knowledge of falsity or reckless disregard of the truth).
338. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 580B, Comment c (1977); Anderson, Libel
and Press Self-Censorship, 53 TEX. L. Rxv. 422, 463-64 (1975); Robertson, Defamation and
the First Amendments: In Praise of Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 54 TEx. L. REv. 199, 244
(1976).
339. See also Smith v. California, 361 U.S. 147 (1959) (first amendment prohibits
imposition of strict liability for the possession of obscene books; defendant must know the
content of the book).
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however, the holding in Gertz indicates that recovery is limited to
"actual injury"; neither punitive nor presumed damages can be re-
covered. 30 By analogy to Gertz, a plaintiff who can show only a negligent
invasion of privacy could be awarded damages for "impairment of...
[privacy], personal humiliation, and mental anguish and suffering"
only if there was evidence to support the award .1
4
These first amendment protections against strict liability do not,
however, impose a significant limitation on the tort proposed by this
Note. This Note has concluded that common law liability should be
imposed only if the defendant could reasonably foresee the injury to
privacy 4 and negligently or intentionally accomplished the invading
act. 34 13 The proposed tort avoids strict liability by requiring negligence;
it therefore complies with the requirement of fault implicitly applicable
to privacy actions on the basis of Gertz. Recovery of damages, however,
will be limited to "actual injury" if the plaintiff cannot show the de-
fendant intentionally or recklessly invaded his privacy.
B. Common Law Defenses
Common law defenses to tort actions are justified on the basis of
exceptional circumstances distorting the usual balance between the con-
flicting interests of the plaintiff, the defendant, and the public. There
are three factors which have particular relevance in providing a common
law defense to tortious invasion of privacy. One factor is the plaintiffs
fault, a second factor is newsworthiness, and a third factor is privilege.
1. The Plaintiff's Fault
Courts have indicated that a person must have a reasonable expecta-
tion of privacy as a condition to its legal protection. This position has
been accepted by this Note. 44 It seems clear, therefore, that the plain-
tiff's contributory fault in allowing his privacy to be invaded will weigh
in favor of a finding that his expectation of privacy was not objectively
reasonable.
The clearest instance in which the plaintiff's fault should bar recovery
is where express consent is given to invade privacy.3 45 Implied consent
340. 348 U.S. at 348-50. For a discussion of the effect of Gertz on the recovery of
damages in a defamation action, see Note, supra note 139, at 110-12.
341. See Gertz v. Robert Welch, Inc., 418 U.S. 323, 350 (1974).
342. See text at 206 supra.
343. See id.
344. Compare text at notes 193-200 supra with text at 206 supra.
345. See, e.g., Sharman v. C. Schmidt & Sons, 216 F. Supp. 401, 405-07 (E.D. Pa. 1963);
Tanner-Brice Co. v. Sims, 174 Ga. 13, 21, 161 S.E. 819, 823 (1931); Dabbs v. Robert S.
Abbott Pub. Co., 44 Ill. App. 2d 438, 193 N.E.2d 876 (1963); Warren & Brandeis, supra
note 28, at 218.
[Vol. 4
60
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss1/5
TORTIOUS INVASION OF PRIVACY
should also bar recovery. 34 6 If the consent is exceeded, however, the
invasion should be actionable and the consent used to mitigate dam-
ages.3 47 For example, consent might be exceeded if the invasion occurs
after a considerable period of time has passed since the consent was
given.
38
A related question is whether public officials or public figures should
be precluded from recovery because they have thrust their lives into the
public domain. Although a few decisions suggest that such persons en-
tirely forfeit their right of privacy,349 the better-reasoned decisions state
that such persons lose their right of privacy only to the extent they have
made their lives public.30
2. Newsworthiness
Although not stated in terms of first amendment protection, the lan-
guage of early cases reflects a concern for the tremendous public interest
in the free flow of information having social and political significance.
To protect this interest, it is generally recognized that newsworthiness
will provide a common law defense to an action for the publication of
private information. 5 '
The viability of this common law defense is questionable, however; it
now might be an aspect of the plaintiffs case. Because the very essence
of the first amendment is the discussion of public controversies, the
common law defense of newsworthiness might be replaced by a first
amendment requirement that the plaintiff prove lack of newsworthiness
as a condition to recovery for publication of private information.?3 This
rgonclusion parallels recent developments in defamation law, where the
defendant's common law defense of truth has been transposed into a
first amendment requirement that the plaintiff prove falsity. 53
346. See, e.g., Gill v. Hearst Pub. Co., 40 Cal. 2d 224, 230, 253 P.2d 441, 444 (1953) (in
bank); Johnson v. Boeing Airplane Co., 175 Kan. 275, 282, 262 P.2d 808, 813-14 (1953);
Thayer v. Worcester Post Co., 284 Mass. 160, 163-64, 187 N.E. 292, 293-94 (1933).
347. See, e.g., Donahue v. Warner Bros. Pictures, Inc., 194 F.2d 6, 13 (10th Cir. 1952);
Canessa v. J.I. Kislak, Inc., 97 N.J. Super. 327, 358-59, 235 A.2d 62, 79-80 (L. Div. 1967).
348. See McAndrews v. Roy, 131 So. 2d 256, 258-59 (La. Ct. App. 1961). But see Sidis
v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S. 711 (1940).
349. See Travers v. Paton, 261 F. Supp. 110, 117 (D. Conn. 1966); Smith v. Surat, 7
Alas. 416, 424-25 (1926).
350. See, e.g., Bell v. Birmingham Broadcasting Co., 266 Ala. 266, 96 So. 2d 263, 265-
66 (1957); Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 122 Ga. 190, 199-200, 50 S.E. 68, 79-80
(1905) (dictum); Munden v. Harris, 153 Mo. App. 652, 660, 134 S.W. 1076, 1079 (1911)
(dictum).
351. E.g., Sidis v. F-R Pub. Corp., 113 F.2d 806, 809 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 311 U.S.
711 (1940); Hurley v. Northwest Pubs., Inc., 273 F. Supp. 967, 976 (D. Minn. 1967), aff'd
per curiam, 398 F.2d 346 (8th Cir. 1968); Berg v. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co., 79 F.
Supp. 957, 961 (D. Minn. 1948); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 28, at 214.
352. See notes 305-17 supra and accompanying text.
353. E.g., Beatty v. Ellings, 285 Minn. 293, 301-02, 173 N.W.2d 12, 17-18 (1969), cert.
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3. Privilege
The common law recognizes special situations in which a defamatory
statement can be made without liability. The common law recognizes
an absolute privilege to communicate a defamatory statement, for ex-
ample, in the course of legislative and judicial proceedings. 35' The com-
mon law also recognizes a qualified privilege to communicate a defama-
tory statement to protect a legitimate interest of the defendant, a third
party, or the general public.'" Unlike an absolute privilege which cannot
be defeated, a qualified privilege is defeated if the defamatory state-
ment is communicated with common law malice such as ill will, spite,
or bad faith s6
Most authorities agree that these privileges also should provide a
defense to an action for tortious invasion of privacy.3 7 These defamation
defenses are well-suited to a privacy action when it is based on the
publication of private information. The analogy to the defamation de-
fense is not as clear, however, when the privacy action is not based on
publication but rather based on intrusion or the unauthorized acquisi-
tion of private information. At least one court has refused to apply the
defamation privileges to an action for the unauthorized acquisition of
private information. 5
It is arguable, however, that the defamation privileges simply pre-
scribe situations in which the defendant or the general public has an
unusually great interest at stake, thereby defining situations in which
liability should not be imposed for otherwise tortious conduct.3 59 Thus,
for example, an employer's qualified defamation privilege to protect his
business by falsely accusing an employee, of theft in the presence of other
denied, 398 U.S. 904 (1970); Note, supra note 139, at 113 & nn.268-73.
354. E.g., Jenson v. Olson, 273 Minn. 390, 393, 141 N.W.2d 488, 490 (1966); Rolfe v.
Noyes Bros. & Cutler, Inc., 157 Minn. 443, 196 N.W. 481 (1923); Peterson v. Steenerson,
113 Minn. 87, 89, 129 N.W. 147, 147 (1910) (dictum).
355. See, e.g., McBride v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., - Minn. ,235 N.W.2d
371, 374 (1975); Clancy v. Daily News Corp., 202 Minn. 1, 8, 277 N.W. 264, 268 (1938);
Burch v. Bernard, 107 Minn. 210, 211-12, 120 N.W. 33, 34 (1909). See generally
RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§ 593-612 (1977).
356. E.g., Hammersten v. Reiling, 262 Minn. 200, 207-08, 115 N.W.2d 259, 264-65, cert.
denied, 371 U.S. 862 (1962); Friedell v. Blakely Printing Co., 163 Minn. 226, 231, 203 N.W.
974, 976 (1925); McKenzie v. William J. Burns Int'l Detective Agency, Inc., 149 Minn.
311, 312, 183 N.W. 516, 517 (1921).
357. See Dennis v. Adcock, 138 Ga. App. 425, 429-30, 226 S.E.2d 292, 295 (1975);
Munsell v. Ideal Food Stores, 208 Kan. 909, 924, 494 P.2d 1063, 1075 (1972); Brents v.
Morgan, 221 Ky. 765, 770, 299 S.W. 967, 970 (1927); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS §§
652F-652G (1977); Warren & Brandeis, supra note 28, at 216.
358. Froelich v. Adair, 213 Kan. 357, 359-60, 516 P.2d 993, 996-97 (1973).
359. Smith, Conditional Privilege for Mercantile Agencies-Macintosh v. Dun, 14
COLUM. L. REv. 187,189-90 (1914); Veeder, Freedom of Public Discussion, 23 HAav. L. REv.
413, 413-14 (1910). See generally Harper, Privileged Defamation, 22 VA. L. REv. 642, 642-
55 (1936); Holmes, Privilege, Malice, and Intent, 8 HARv. L. REv. 1 (1894).
[Vol. 4
62
William Mitchell Law Review, Vol. 4, Iss. 1 [1978], Art. 5
http://open.mitchellhamline.edu/wmlr/vol4/iss1/5
TORTIOUS INVASION OF PRIVACY
employees could be transposed into an employer's qualified privacy
privilege to tap an employee's business telephone for the recovery of
stolen goods.6 0 This approach seems preferable to a general rejection of
the analogy to defamation privileges in cases involving intrusion or the
unauthorized acquisition of private information.
V. CONCLUSION
The achievement of justice requires the court's understanding of the
interests locked in dispute. The scales of justice are ill-used if the wrong
interests are placed on one side of the balance. In determining injury to
privacy, it is therefore critical that a court consider privacy interests;
Prosser distorts the balance by adding irtterests of reputation and prop-
erty. The tort proposed by this Note is an attempt to afford greater
justice by defining conduct which primarily injures privacy, not reputa-
tion or property.
Social scientists envision privacy as dialectic: a person's control over
both one, when he receives social stimuli from others and two, when he
gives social stimuli to others. The proposed tort is likewise characterized
by two types of invasion: intrusion, to afford redress when unwanted
social stimuli is received from others; and the unauthorized use of pri-
vate information, to afford redress when social stimuli is coerced from
the plaintiff without his consent. It was concluded that an invasion
could not be actionable unless it was at least negligently accomplished,
highly offensive, and unreasonable according to community mores.
Finally, the constitutional and common law limitations on the pro-
posed tort were examined. The most significant constitutional limita-
tion is on recovery for the unauthorized disclosure of a private, newswor-
thy fact. A plaintiff cannot recover for such disclosures. Also, the com-
mon law might afford a significant defense on the basis of consent or
privilege.
Prosser himself challenged the legal profession to analyze precisely
the tort of invasion of privacy and to "realize what we are doing and give
some consideration to the question of where, if anywhere, we are to call
a halt. 13 ' This Note has accepted his challenge and is an attempt to
improve his accomplishments.
360. See People v. Appelbaum, 277 App. Div. 43, 45, 97 N.Y.S.2d 807, aff'd, 301 N.Y.
738, 95 N.E.2d 410 (1950); Schmukler v. Ohio-Bell Tel. Co., 66 Ohio Law Abs. 213, 224,
116 N.E.2d 819, 826 (C.P. 1953).
361. Prosser, supra note 28, at 423.
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